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TRAINING A SPIRIT-FILLED MINISTRY

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EDITORIAL STAFF

Editor

HAROLD B. KUHN

Associate Editors

GEORGE A. TURNER

C. ELYAN OLMSTEAD

JAMES D. ROBERTSON

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The President's Letter

JULIAN C. MCPHEETERS

The enrollment for the fall quarter of 1947 at Asbury Theological Seminary shows a substantial increase over the fall quarter of 1946. The enrollment for the present quarter is 224 as compared to 188 a year ago.

An analysis of the enrollment for the fall quarter reveals the following items of interest: New students 84; students returning after absence of one or more quarters 13; veterans 48; B. D. candidates 195; M. R. E. candidates 24; Auditors and special 3; not working toward degrees 2; states 33; countries 7; denominations 23; colleges and universities 66; seminaries 9.

The new H. C. Morrison Memorial Administration Building was occupied for classes in October. The administrative offices of the seminary were moved into the new building in November. The official dedication of the new building has been postponed until the Ministers' Conference in February. The new building represents an investment of \$240,000, exclusive of lot and furnishings. The library has been moved into the dining hall of the building, pending the erection of the new library building.

The Betty Morrison Memorial Hall, an apartment house for married students, which is now under construction, is approximately two-thirds complete. Failure to have this building completed for the fall quarter made it necessary for us to disappoint quite a number of applicants for admission, for lack of room.

The architect will submit the plans for the bids for the new Estes Chapel about the first of March. The new chapel will have a seating capacity of 700. There will be a small prayer chapel as a wing to main chapel which will become a focal point in the prayer life of the seminary.

The old administration building of the seminary has been named by the Board of Trustees, "Larabee-Morris Hall." The new name is in honor of Dr. F. H. Larabee, Dean Emeritus, and Dr. Frank P. Morris, Professor of Doctrine. This worthy tribute to two of the most honored members of the faculty was hailed with enthusiastic approval and applause when the announcement was made at a chapel service, on October 22nd.

Dr. R. P. Shuler, Pastor of Trinity Methodist Church, Los Angeles, delivered the sermon at the inaugural ceremonies for five new professors on October the 22nd. Dean Charles Lynn Pyatt, Executive Secretary of the American Association of Theological Schools, brought greetings from the Association. The new professors inaugurated were W. C. Mavis, M.Th., Ph.D., Dean, John Wesley Seminary Foundation, and Professor of Pastoral Counseling; J.

(Continued on Page 169)

Editorial--

Faith and Reason: A Perennial Problem

The intensity with which the question of the relation of faith to reason is being considered today has scarcely a parallel in history. It is small wonder that the layman is beginning to ask whether man's progress at this point must always be Penelope-like, each generation unraveling what the former had done, and beginning over. Nor is it reassuring to him to learn that little agreement has been reached concerning even the meanings of the basic terms employed in the investigation. But since the question is still an open one, there is no reason to apologize for one more editorial dealing with it.

The Faith-Reason problem is, basically, the modern form of the ancient conflict between religion and philosophy. Plato saw the conflict as between the poets (especially Homer and Hesiod, who were the spokesmen for traditional Greek theology) and the philosophers. The conflict, however, becomes more acute when theology has come to connote, not the heroic poetry of a people, but a body of authoritative religious teaching, claiming to grow out of a concrete historical setting, and proposing to challenge many of the accepted conclusions, not only of philosophy but also of experimental science.

It is difficult to avoid the observation, that some contemporary thinkers have been extreme in their assertions that the current modes of scientific understanding of man and his world are to be equated with the necessary and final conclusions of reason, and as such can be viewed only as antithetical to faith. This assumes a finality to scientific assumptions which is difficult to square with the usual definition of 'reason'. This definition is two-

fold: reason is both the capacity to discover truth by thinking, and the ability to relate this truth to concrete action. As such, it is scarcely to be linked finally with any scientific approach to reality, since science has its fads and makes its false starts.

This raises the more important question, is there any *semper, ubique, et ab omnibus* of reason? The stereotype of the eighteenth century rationalist is held to have thought so. More recently positivism has denied that such a Reason ever existed or will exist. All we can expect, it asserts, is a substitution of the term 'warrantably assertible' for 'truth' and a constant modification of conclusions in the light of further scientific inquiry. Some will inquire whether this is not a rather naïve reliance upon the techniques of science. But however we may think of this, it seems clear that the classic rationalist assumption, that the conclusions of reason, once achieved, are of perennial and unchanging value, can no longer go unchallenged.

How, then, are we to think of reason? If it is not an instrument for discovering a complete system of perennial and final truth through its exploration of its own logical harmony, and if on the other hand it is naïve to equate it with scientific inquiry, then what can be said for it? Possibly the answer is to be found through the observation that both of these solutions are too simple.

Several contemporary movements have come to our aid at this point. While it is impossible for most of us to give a blanket vote of confidence to the newer psychology, we must acknowledge gratefully the challenge to simple rationalism which has come from its assertion that the human ego

is subject to both challenge and deception by the processes which lie below the level of recognized consciousness. In the light of this, it is difficult to assert without explanation the sovereignty of reason, even though we assert against Freud, that morality (and hence responsibility) can be found at every level of mind. Any hypnotist will tell us that, whether the mind be rightly divided into conscious and unconscious and/or subconscious, or whether it exists in varying degrees of consciousness, morality is present along the entire mental scale. In any case, reason can scarcely be credited with the achievements and possibilities with which eighteenth-century thought was inclined to invest her.

The second blow which contemporary thought has dealt to the classical view of reason is that which comes from the dialectical movement. This asserts that the antinomies which occur in thought when we begin to think *existentially* arise from the basically dialectical character of our elementary principles of thought. This in turn can be interpreted in one of two ways: possibly it grows out of the antinomy which appears when the finite faces the Infinite; or possibly it goes more deeply still, to the nature of reality. In other words, possibly Przywara is correct in interpreting the whole of reality in terms of essential polarity.

In any case, rational thought is dialectical in character. This being true, even philosophizing is far from being the simple affair that some have thought. It was Kant who called the attention of modern philosophy to this fact—a fact of which Plato was well aware, and which he set forth in the *Parmenides*. The meaning of this for our present discussion is, that reason must, in the light of more recent insights, accept a humbler and more disciplined place than her adherents have claimed for her in her feud with faith.

It is evident, of course, that assert-

ing the limitations of reason as an instrument for achieving truth is one thing; and offering a solution to the problem of reason and faith is quite another. At this point, however, both common fairness and clarity demand that some attention be given to the current understanding of what is meant by 'faith'. At one extreme stands the view held by Auguste Comte. His three stages of human culture may be illustrated as follows: the period of faith was that age of humanity in which simple creatures traced their steps in the snow of theology. The age of metaphysics was that which skated somewhat unimaginatively upon the hard bits of ice which remained when most of the snow had melted. The age of positivism (extending until the present) is the age of critical labors in the sunshine which has evaporated both the snow of theology and the ice crust of metaphysics.

Modern empiricism is not far different from earlier positivism in its view of faith, which amounts to a confidence in the techniques and conclusions of experimental science. This given, the area of knowledge is confined to those subjects or conclusions which are referable to the five senses for verification. Empiricists of this thorough-going character are frank in insisting that all we know of man and his world contradicts the teachings of traditional religion in general, and historic Christianity in particular. At best, faith is an escape from life's hard necessities, essential perhaps to the unlearned, but valuable only as it satisfies certain emotional needs—needs which will evaporate with the increased spread of scientific knowledge.

At the opposite extreme stands an uncritical fundamentalism, which makes sweeping assertions concerning matters of which it knows little or nothing. Without even taking the pains which thinkers of the Middle Ages exercised to develop their view of a *duplex veritas*, uncritical funda-

mentalism assumes as *given* that religious truth, interpreted in its own facile manner, is completely and easily reconcilable with truth in all other areas of human life and knowledge. This minimizes the entire problem of struggle which is involved in the matter of interpretation of the Bible. Rejecting the latitudinarian view which theological liberals have taken of Paul's famous metaphor: "For the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life," (II Corinthians 3:6) uncritical fundamentalism seeks to solve the problems which arise in interpretation at the level of *the letter*, this being frequently attempted without even taking recourse to the Scripture in the languages in which it was originally written.

Between these two extremes stands the Crisis Theology, with its prior division of the field of knowledge into two areas, and its subsequent assertion of the non-rational character of religious truth. It is probable that most of us reared in the Anglo-American intellectual tradition can scarcely bring to the dialectical approach a proper sympathy of mind. Perhaps if we in America possessed something parallel to the *Nibelungenlied*, and had learned from our earliest years to enter sympathetically into the spirit of some such national epic, we could then comprehend better the idea of super-existence (*Urgeschichte*). As things stand, we tend to view such concepts as impossible-because-illogical; our exaggerated practicality prevents us from understanding what Barth and Brunner are trying to say.

This writer is not suggesting that the dialectical theologians have the right answer to the problem of Faith-Reason. He is simply acknowledging that some of the language-forms in which these men couch their views are such that most of us do not properly understand them. What contribution, then, can we expect to find in their system (and the crisis theology seems to be hardening into a semblance of

a system) which will correct our extremes, and which may point the way to a solution?

But some reader will object, that we have prejudiced this newer theology, and have given no good reasons for doing so. The chief objection to the dialectical theology seems to be, that it has carried its principle of dialectic too far. It is one thing to say that the nature of mind (and perhaps also the nature of reality) demands a movement of alternation in the reasoning process. It is quite another to say that the entire world of thought is a house radically divided. Again, it is one thing to assert that the knowledge upon which faith rests is something less than absolutely certain (from the point of view of pure intellect), and that faith is the link between such knowledge and religious certainty. It is quite another thing to assert that faith accepts as true that which is rationally absurd. That which is deeper than human consciousness is not necessarily irrational.

More specifically, it seems that the approach to the Bible which the dialectical theologians make is no more adequate than that taken by uncritical fundamentalists. The former overload the rôle of 'spirit' in interpretation, and fail to do justice to the historical matrix in which the Scriptures are set. The latter place an uncritical (and therefore exaggerated) emphasis upon the 'letter' and become wooden in their approach. Neither seem able to make the necessary allowance for a spirit of tentativeness which is essential to the solution of a problem which has so many places of openness, and so many points at which tension is inevitable.

In short, the Faith-Reason controversy is too complex for any easy solution. So long as the God of faith transcends the sphere of any determinate being, the mind of man can only approximate a knowledge of Him. Even a Revelation of Him will at some points be, necessarily, set in terms

which will be above our powers of thought. But this is quite different from asserting that such a Revelation is basically irrational.

Both the dialectical theology and uncritical fundamentalism seem to be outgrowths of moods of impatience. Such moods are understandable, particularly in times like these. Both movements have something to say; either seems preferable to the solution offered by scientific humanism. Fundamentalism is strong in its contention that the truth of Revelation is inseparable from the accuracy of the historical setting out of which the Bible came. It deserves to be heard as well for its insistence upon the possibility of a literal supernatural invasion of the natural order by the Creative Cause.

The dialectical theology has, on the other hand, made a valuable contribution to the exploration of the problem in hand, in its assertion that not all will be easy going in the understanding of the ways of the Infinite. At the same time, it appears weak in its inability to distinguish between what is factual, and what is the cipher in God's self-expression to men. The problem of religious knowledge, especially in its relation to the question of the objective truth of Christianity, cannot be solved apart from some more adequate comprehension of this question. And we venture that if and when such a solution is achieved, it will be found to leave us a Bible which is much more acceptable as historically accurate than most moderns now believe.

—H. B. K.

Our Contributors

JULIAN C. MCPHEETERS, LL.D., is president of Asbury Theological Seminary. Well known in Christian journalism and as a religious leader, he makes a welcome contribution through his page in this journal.

MALDWYN L. EDWARDS (Ph.D., University of London) is Secretary of the Temperance and Welfare Department of the Methodist Church in Great Britain. Published here is his address delivered at the Methodist Ecumenical Conference in Springfield, Massachusetts, this year.

J. HAROLD GREENLEE (Ph. D., Harvard University) is professor of Greek in Asbury Theological Seminary, and secretary-treasurer of the Asbury Seminary Alumni Association. Published in this issue in his inaugural dissertation.

HAROLD C. MASON (Ed.D., Indiana University) is professor of Christian Education in Northern Baptist Theological Seminary.

CLAUDE A. RIES (Th. D., Northern Baptist Theological Seminary) is professor of Greek in Houghton College (New York).

SPECIAL NOTICE

Beginning in the Spring (March) issue, the ASBURY SEMINARIAN will publish in series the Glide Lectures for 1946, delivered at the Seminary by Dr. Paul S. Rees.

The Modern State and Human Values

MALDWYN L. EDWARDS

The Cloister and the Hearth is not as widely read as formerly. Indeed for those who desire historical accuracy, it is not a reliable novel. Nevertheless, I know of no book which gives so vivid a picture of the closing years of the Middle Ages. Gerard, the hero of the book, is the father of Erasmus who, more than any other man, signified the closing of one epoch in human history and the dawning of another. In the exciting adventures of Gerard, the reader receives a vivid impression of an age in which there were no tariff barriers and no passports, but an age in which mercenaries, pilgrims, and students jostled each other along the great highways of Europe. The Holy Roman Empire retained a shadowy authority over the people of Europe because nationalism had not yet come to its flowering. The Catholic Church still retained the undivided allegiance of the faithful because the Teutonic peoples had not come to a religious self-consciousness.

It was in many respects an impressive, if somewhat inelastic unity which Europe presented, but the end was bound to come. In the famous dialogue between the Earl of Warwick and the Bishop of Beauvais in Bernard Shaw's play "Saint Joan," the Bishop of Beauvais says to Warwick, "As a priest I have gained knowledge of the minds of common people and there you will find a more dangerous idea. I can express it only by such phrases as 'France for the French, England for the English, Italy for the Italians, Spain for the Spanish . . .'" The retort of Warwick is that the protest is that of the individual soul against in-

terference of priest or peer. "If I had to find a name for it, I should," he said, "call it Protestantism."

The good Bishop had not long to wait for the fulfilment of his words. With the breakdown of Medieval solidarity, there came a full-fledged nationalism. Henry VIII, Francis I, Charles V are all Renaissance monarchs, rejoicing in their sense of power. The process of disintegration, once begun, had to work itself out. Hobbes was the great apologist for absolute monarchy, Locke defended limited monarchy, and towards the end of the Eighteenth Century, Godwin, Paine and Rousseau were advocating a democracy in which the people at last had come into their own. It was this philosophy, incidentally, which influenced the Declaration of Rights preceding the War of American Independence. The American Constitution itself was largely shaped by religious independence and by this particular ferment in political thinking.

After the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the individualistic democracy at the close of the Eighteenth Century, there was a fourth stage, reached roughly by the middle of the Nineteenth Century. The great legal writer, A. V. Dicey, has called this last period the "age of collectivism." Individualism has many advantages. In economics, it worked extremely well while markets were expanding and fresh trade was being continually developed. In politics it justified itself in its removal of all hindrances to individual initiative. To free a man from encumbrances is to render that man service. But individualism had its

grave disadvantages. If the State is only content to act as umpire while the fight is in progress and not directly to interfere, great hardship is done to those who are the weak and unprivileged and handicapped. This began to be realized as the Nineteenth Century wore on and so the State began increasingly to interfere on behalf of those who must need its help. Gradually, in the course of collectivist legislation, the State extended its scope. It not merely removed hindrances but endeavored to create the right conditions for the living of the good life. This meant inevitably that the State by its very paternalism increased in power. This growth in the authority and prestige of the State was enormously increased by three factors in our modern world.

The ever-widening complexity of economic relations hastened the development from individual to state trading. There came the familiar stages of the private employer, the limited company, the combine, the monopoly, and then the direct or indirect control of the state. This has not only been true of internal but of external trade so that a state more and more engages in trade talks with other states. In the recent discussions on the Marshall Plan, many of the nations under the influence of Russia adopted an attitude of economic nationalism.

But the modern state has not only grown in power because of the ramifications of commerce; it has also become more powerful through the epoch-making discoveries in science. We live at this moment in an age of atomic energy, and this one discovery by itself threatens our very lives. It is obvious that discoveries of this magnitude cannot be entrusted to individuals but must be under the care and responsibility of the State. That means once again an increase in the power of the State over the individual lives of its citizens.

The third factor is the most impor-

tant of all. We have suffered from two world wars with their long and bitter aftermath. After this second conflict the greater part of the world lies exhausted and most grievously sick. When Henry Carter returned from a recent trip to Europe, he spoke of the heart of Europe as only faintly beating. This condition produces fear and insecurity. People are not capable of making their own decisions. They fly too easily to the security and authority of the State. Above everything else, they desire to be freed from the nightmare of recurrent want and disease and war, and it seems to them that only in a strong and efficient State can they be secure. Although in the First World War one of the great slogans by which young men were urged to go out and fight was the slogan that 'we were going to make the world safe for democracy', the world became most dangerously unsafe for democracy; and Communism, Naziism, and Fascism, grew out of a congenial soil. In like fashion the conclusion of the six years of the Second World War made inevitable the further growth of totalitarianism. Democracy flourishes in days of peace, and struggles desperately in days when the hearts of men have failed because of the things that have come to pass on the earth.

It is indeed a strange and fearful situation in which we find ourselves. Enlightened thinkers in all countries recognize that we have come by the movement of history to a point when a nation cannot achieve its own strength. They have come to recognize further that even an alliance of nations cannot hope to gain its own ends against another alliance of nations. By the very logic of history men are being driven to a society of nations and that inevitably involves a limitation of the absolute sovereignty of national States. And yet at this very time when the safety of us all depends upon world law and some form of world community and the limitation of national pow-

er, we are being confronted with the spectacle of nationalism, naked and unashamed. But if the modern collectivist State is not willing to limit its sovereignty in the interests of world peace, is it likely to limit its sovereign power within the State for the preservation of human values? But before that question can be answered, it must be recognized that here are two directions in which the modern State can move. One is toward the police State in which the individual is set at a discount and the other is towards an organic democracy in which the individual feels himself to be an integral part of the whole. It can be stated in another way. The issue in the future lies between a social democracy and a communistic form of democracy.

It is easy to see how nations drunk with sight of power, find it easy to become rigid and authoritarian. Philosophically the idea of human rights rests on the premise that man had rights first of all in the state of nature and these were guaranteed to him when he entered society. But when another school of thought arose and explained history in terms of economics, and spoke philosophically in terms of dialectical materialism, the whole Eighteenth Century philosophy of individual rights came crashing to the ground. Once you cease to believe in God, you cease to believe in the importance of man. If he has been cast accidentally on to the shores of time and if there is no God to whom he is responsible, the race goes to the strong and the State may sweat, exploit or oppress a man with impunity. If God goes, the State will occupy the vacuum which has been created; and man, instead of worshipping God, will be called upon to worship the omnicompetent State.

The Eighteenth Century defense of human values has not only been exposed to the withering fire of Marx and Engels, and indeed of the great Nineteenth Century European social-

ists; it has been undermined by its own inadequate philosophy. With varying degrees of awareness, it began to be realized in the Western democracies that if an individual be credited with certain rights, then these rights may be insisted upon even in opposition to the State. This atomistic view of human nature could lead directly to anarchy and disorder. It became more and more clear that there must be an identification of interest between the individual and the State in the service of the common good. The first indication of this change of attitude is to be found in the writings of Mazzini. There are, he said, no rights but duties. In England, T. H. Green, Edward Caird and Bernard Bosanquet spoke each in his own way, not of rights but of obligations. Jefferson once wrote that a man has no private rights in opposition to his social charities. It was the setting forth of that organic democracy in which, to quote the glowing words of Edmund Burke, there is a living partnership of the governed.

It is this type of collectivism that we believe must be a pattern for modern democracies. But this dynamic conception of an organic State in which justice is done both to the whole and to the part, cannot possibly be realized except through the Christian Faith. For it demands two great Christian postulates. There must be first of all the Christian valuation of God. Since God is Father and Lord, the State can never be an end in itself. It is an ordinance of God and can be either a worthy or unworthy instrument in His hands. "There is no power but God," said John Wesley. "To Him peoples and governments are alike responsible." In the second place, there is required the Christian valuation of man. Of himself, the individual person has no importance; but he is of infinite significance as one for whom Christ died. The great service of Swedish theology in our day has been to

direct attention once again to the *agape* of God. He loves the unlovely, and desires us despite our lack of merit.

We speak of inalienable human values because man is no disconsolate wanderer in an alien universe, but is the very child of God. It is for this reason that Kant's maxim remains wholly Christian. No man must be treated as a means towards another man's end.

The modern State, if it is to function properly, must rest on this religious principle; but how can this be done except through the uncompromising witness of the Church to the claims of God and the infinite worth of man? And within the mystical company, which is the very body of Christ, who can fulfill this function better than the Methodist Church throughout the world? We were raised up to stress the truth that a man can be saved by faith in God; that a man can be joyously aware of that salvation and that a man can press on to full salvation. It is all an amazing commentary on the significance of the individual in God's sight, and upon the amazing possibilities that open out to the humblest believer.

It is the universal Church, in which we Methodists proudly take our place, that must ever express the conscience of the community. But conscience does not merely disapprove the wrong; it also approves the good. It is part of our witness to say, No! to the overwhelming pretensions of the State. We have to offer an unwavering defense when human values are threatened. We dare not leave one sphere of activity to the State and occupy our-

selves only with pietistic concerns. We cannot surrender the Crown Rights of the Redeemer. But as we say, No! to Caesar worship, we say, Yes! whenever the State takes any action which is timely, expedient and morally justifiable, for we recognize that the State is, in the argument of Paul's letter to the Romans, a constituted authority of God for the restraint of evil and the maintenance of good. Our task therefore is not only to defend human values against any encroachment of the State, but to approve any action which more fully conserves those values and enables man as a free and responsible agent to take his proper place within the life of the whole.

We who belong to the church are, in the words of Jesus, the salt of the earth. Salt is a pungent preservative against corruption. That is the reason the church has an essential part to play in the life of every country. If we succeed in our task, we may save civilization. In God's dealings with Abraham, the city was spared because of ten righteous men. If we are cowardly or timid or apathetic in the day of testing, we pass under the condemnation of God. There is no judgment more terrible than that passed upon the salt that has lost its savour. If we fail in our duty we become that savourless salt that is good for nothing but to be trodden under the foot of men.

The Church is often derided and misunderstood, and is most certainly subject to strange neglect. Nevertheless it proclaims the Word of God, and that Word is the very charter of democracy and the final vindicator of the common man.

ἵνα Substantive Clauses in the New Testament

J. HAROLD GREENLEE

An examination of the Greek grammars seems to indicate that, in the past, scholars have attempted to deal with the conjunction ἵνα in the New Testament upon an inadequate basis. Since its meaning in classical Greek was almost exclusively "in order that", introducing a purpose clause, scholars seem to have felt that it was thus limited in New Testament usage. Often the translation has had to be modified from "in order that" to "that" to avoid doing violence to the obvious sense of the passage; but since in English "that" can serve either as a shortened form of "in order that" or as a conjunction introducing a substantive clause, grammarians have apparently long attempted to press some sort of purpose idea into almost every ἵνα clause.

Some progress has, indeed, been made toward freeing ἵνα clauses from this limitation in New Testament usage. Winer,¹ who wrote approximately a century ago, admits the occasional use of ἵνα as an object clause, but it is easy to see that he insists upon a purpose idea for ἵνα clauses where it is even remotely possible.² Dods refers to a statement by Simcox which is a bit more broadminded, admitting that "Sometimes, beyond doubt, ἵνα is used where the final element in the sense is very much weakened—some-

times where it is hard to deny that it has altogether vanished".³

The statement attributed to Simcox at least expresses the basic principle which many scholars seem to have used with reference to ἵνα—that its "proper" meaning had to be "in order that", and that ἵνα would adopt any other meaning only at the peril of committing linguistic heresy.

Scholars of recent years have come to recognize the existence of a more or less limited number of "non-final" ἵνα clauses—clauses without the idea of purpose. Yet the twilight existence which grammarians have too generally granted these clauses is typified by Machen's statement in his *New Testament Greek for Beginners*: "In addition to the use by which it expresses purpose, ἵνα with the subjunctive is very frequently used after words of exhorting, wishing, striving, and in various ways that are not easily classified".⁴ Burton⁵ is forced to use six categories for the uses of ἵνα. One of these is the purpose clause, one is the clause of conceived result (which for the purpose of this article need not be considered separately from the purpose clause), leaving four classifications to which Burton gives the following rather vague

¹ Winer, George Benedict, *A Grammar of the New Testament Diction* (2 vols.), translated by Edward Masson, 1859.

² See pp. 350-5, 483. See also Abbott, Edwin A., *Johannine Grammar*, 1906, sections 2094-2132.

³ In *Expositor's Greek Testament*, I, p. 730. Dods gives as the source of this statement Simcox's *Grammar*, a book which the present writer has not located.

⁴ P. 197.

⁵ Burton, Ernest De Witt, *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses in New Testament Greek*, 1943, p. 84.

characteristics (*italics* are Burton's) :

- Object clauses after verbs of *exhorting*, etc.
- Object clauses after verbs of *striving*, etc.
- Subject, predicate, and appositive clauses.
- Complementary and epexegetic clauses.

Abbott-Smith¹ says that ὅτι as a conjunction is "properly" a final conjunction, denoting purpose; but that in late writers it may be definitive, as the equivalent of an infinitive, after verbs of wishing, striving, saying, and after certain substantives and other words.

The only recognition Green² apparently gives at all to these non-final clauses is several lines of small print on pp. 320-1, and much of this seems to the present writer to be unsatisfactory. That Green considers these clauses of only minor significance is seen in his statement, "The Evangelist John often (with, occasionally, others of the New Testament writers) employs ὅτι as explanatory . . . ; but in other passages the usual meaning of the particle may be taken . . ."

Robertson³ devotes several pages to non-final ὅτι clauses, especially pp. 991-7. He designates them "sub-final clauses", and, while he acknowledges in parentheses that they are "really object or subject clauses like ὅτι clauses", yet he seems reluctant to admit that they have any independent identity. "There are a considerable number of clauses," he states, "which are not pure purpose and yet are not result. They are the bridge, in a sense, between the two extremes".⁴ He does, however, go further than Green as regards the frequency of their occurrence, commenting that "the examples in the N. T. are too numerous to give a complete list".⁵

¹ Abbott-Smith, G., *A Manual Greek Lexicon of the New Testament*, 1944.

² Green, Samuel G., *Handbook to the Grammar of the Greek New Testament*, rev. ed.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Robertson, A. T., *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research*, 1923.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 991.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 993.

Blass⁶ is aware of one aspect of these non-final clauses. He points out⁷ that there are several usages which may be expressed either by an infinitive construction or by a "periphrasis". He illustrates the fact that in some instances the alternative to an infinitive construction is a ὅτι clause with the subjunctive mood, while in other instances the alternative is a ὅτι clause. The ὅτι clause, he states, is the alternative to an infinitive for an explanatory construction⁸ and after certain verbs which he lists,⁹ while the ὅτι clause is the alternative construction after other verbs.¹⁰ Yet, even though in his discussion of the use of a ὅτι explanatory clause he notes that "if the epexegetical phrase consists of facts, John uses not ὅτι but ὅτι", he apparently quite fails to see the principle upon which, throughout the New Testament, an explanatory clause is a ὅτι clause in some instances and a ὅτι clause in others.¹¹

Moulton,¹² however, takes a rather realistic view of this type of clause. He lists some examples of this "non-final" use of ὅτι from the papyri to illustrate his opinion that this usage cannot be attributed to Latin influence. He continues by saying,

In such clauses, which remind us immediately of Mt 4³ 16²⁰, Mk 5¹⁰ 3⁹ etc., the naturalness of the development is obvious from the simple fact that the purpose clause with ὅτι is merely a use of the jussive subjunctive . . . , which makes its appearance after a verb of commanding or wish-

⁶ Blass, Friedrich, *Grammar of New Testament Greek*, translated by Henry St. John Thackeray, 1898.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 222-33.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 229.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 225-8.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 230-3.

¹¹ See also the later edition, Blass, Friedrich, *Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch*, vierte Auflage besorgt von Albert Debrunner, 1913.

¹² Moulton, James Hope, *A Grammar of New Testament Greek*. Vol. I, *Prolegomena*, 1906, p. 208.

ing entirely reasonable. . . . From such sentences, in which the object clause, from the nature of the governing verb, had a jussive sense in it which made the subjunctive natural, there was an easy transition to object clauses in which the jussive idea was absent. The careful study of typical sentences like Mt 10²⁵ 8⁸ (contrast 3¹¹) 18⁶, Jn 1²⁷ (contr. Lk 15¹⁹) 43⁴ 15^{8,13}, Lk 14³ (for which Winer quotes a close parallel from Epictetus), will show anyone who is free from predisposition that *ἵνα* can lose the last shred of purposive meaning. If the recognition of a purpose conception will suit the context better than the denial of it, we remain entirely free to assume it; but the day is past for such strictness as great commentators like Meyer and Westcott were driven to by the supposed demands of grammar".²⁰

It was apparently left for Dana and Mantey, in their *Manual Grammar of the Greek New Testament*,²¹ to deal with these clauses for the less advanced student. Putting it in a more elementary form than does Moulton, these scholars say,

Then *ἵνα* is also used frequently in a non-final sense in object-clauses in the New Testament. It is simply the equivalent of *ὅτι* scores of times. At such times the translation *that* suggests its force. . . . Or the *ἵνα* clause can be translated in many cases just as well by an infinitive clause".²²

The illustration they use is that in Mark 7:26, καὶ ἤρωτα αὐτὸν ἵνα τὸ δαιμόνιον ἐκβάλῃ ἐκ τῆς θυγατρὸς αὐτῆς, translating it by a substantive clause, "and she asked him *that he cast the demon out of her daughter*", or by an infinitive clause, "and she asked him *to cast the demon out*". Dana and Mantey also refer to *ἵνα* clauses used in apposition, quoting two examples, one of which is John 13:34, ἐντολὴν καινὴν δίδωμι ὑμῖν ἵνα ἀγαπᾶτε ἀλλήλους, translating it, "a new commandment I give to you (namely) *that you love one another*".²³

Dana and Mantey thus seem ready to break with tradition and to let these clauses stand in their own right; yet

even they seem to have failed to go all the way in identifying and properly classifying this type of *ἵνα* clause. The purpose of the present article will therefore be threefold: 1) to point out the existence of *ἵνα substantive clauses* as a distinct type in the New Testament, 2) to classify them, and 3) to set forth a practical means for identifying them.

The FIRST BASIC HYPOTHESIS of the present article is as follows:

In New Testament Greek there are two separate and distinct usages of *ἵνα* which ought no more to be confused than the two distinct meanings of *ὅτι*. The first of these meanings is to be translated "in order that", and is to be used where the *ἵνα* clause is a *purpose* clause. This type of clause answers the question "Why?" The second of these meanings is to be translated "that", in the same sense in which *ὅτι* is translated "that", and is to be used where the *ἵνα* clause is a *substantive* clause. This type of clause answers the question "What?"

It is to be further insisted that *ἵνα* substantive clauses are not merely to be tolerated as being nothing more than wayward children from the fold of *ἵνα* purpose clauses. This article will not attempt to deal with their origin,²⁴ but simply maintains that in New Testament Greek these clauses are clearly distinct from *ἵνα* purpose clauses. As such, they deserve the right to their own identity and meaning, not only when the idea of "purpose" has tried and failed to embrace them within its compass, but rather at any time when the sense of the passage in question naturally calls for a substantive clause rather than a purpose clause.²⁵ Here again reference may be made to the analogous cases of the two mean-

²⁰ *Loc. cit.*

²¹ By Dana, H. E., and Julius R. Mantey, 1927.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 248.

²³ *Loc. cit.*

²⁴ See Moulton, *loc. cit.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*

ings of ὅτι. There is no presumption in favor of one or the other of the meanings of ὅτι. If the context indicates that the ὅτι clause should be considered a causal clause, ὅτι is translated "because"; if the context indicates a substantive clause, ὅτι is translated "that". An even closer analogy is the usage of ὅπως. Even in classical Greek, from Homer on, ὅπως, in addition to its use in "final" clauses, was used to introduce object clauses after certain verbs meaning to strive, to effect, to plan, to take care, etc.¹⁸ Liddell and Scott say that ὅπως with the subjunctive is sometimes used after verbs of will and endeavor, instead of the infinitive.¹⁹

An important point in this discussion is that these "non-final" or substantive clauses are *not* of only rare or occasional occurrence in the New Testament, as most scholars seem to have maintained. Robertson²⁰ states that one scholar counts 746 Ι᾽α clauses in the Westcott-Hort text of the New Testament. An examination in Moulton and Geden's *Concordance to the Greek Testament*²¹ indicates that over fourteen percent of these are undoubtedly Ι᾽α substantive clauses, with an additional eight percent deserving of consideration. Even if quite a number which here are counted as substantive clauses be charged to the over-enthusiasm of the present writer, there must still remain a sufficient number to demand thoughtful attention.

Having pointed out that Ι᾽α substantive clauses are of frequent occurrence in the New Testament and therefore of appreciable importance, the question of

proper identification suggests itself. Can a classification of them be made which will be more definite than that of Burton or that of Dana and Mantey?²² An examination of these clauses and their contexts seems to indicate clearly that such a classification can be made, upon the following basis:

In Greek, as in English, indirect statements may be given in either of two forms—the first is a substantive clause, the second is an infinitive construction. The substantive clause would be introduced by the word "that". An example of English usage is as follows:

Direct statement: "He is a good man."

Indirect statement: "I say *that* he is a good man"; or, "I know *that* he is a good man."

"I say him *to be* a good man"; or, "I know him *to be* a good man."²³

These examples would accordingly appear in Greek as follows:

Direct statement: ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐστίν.

Indirect (substantive clause): λέγω ὅτι ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐστίν, or γινώσκω ὅτι . . .

Indirect (infinitive): λέγω αὐτὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, or, γινώσκω αὐτὸν . . .

These examples, however, involve only the *indicative* mood of the verb within the discourse. What form will the indirect discourse take if the original statement is an imperative, a hortatory subjunctive, or some such idea? This possibility seems to be avoided by grammarians, so far as Greek is concerned. Burton does give his reasons for omitting these constructions from his discussion:

The term indirect discourse is commonly applied only to indirect assertions and indirect questions. Commands, promises, and hopes indirectly quoted

¹⁸ Goodwin, William W., *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb*, 1880, pp. 73-9.

¹⁹ Liddell, Henry George, and Robert Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon* (2 vols.). Revised and augmented by Henry Stuart Jones and Roderick McKenzie, 1940.

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 985.

²¹ Moulton, W. F., and A. S. Geden, 3rd ed., 1926.

²² Pp. 155, 156 of this article.

²³ The participial construction in indirect quotation, which is sometimes used in Greek—e.g., I Jn. 4:2—need not enter into this discussion.

might without impropriety be included under the term, but are, in general, excluded because of the difficulty of drawing the line between them and certain similar usages, in which, however, no direct form can be thought of. Thus the Infinitive after a verb of commanding might be considered the representative in indirect discourse of an Imperative in the direct discourse; . . . while for the Infinitive after verbs of striving, which in itself can scarcely be regarded as of different force from those after verbs of commanding and wishing, no direct form can be thought of."

The validity of these reasons may well be questioned. This article purposes to show that such constructions both *can* be classified and also *need* to be classified for a proper understanding of New Testament usage.

This classification can be made in English; and for the purpose of illustration the three forms of statement given above in the indicative mood are changed to the *imperative* mood, as follows:

Direct statement: "Son, be a good man."

Indirect (substantive clause): "I command my son *that he be* a good man."

Indirect (infinitive): "I commanded my son *to be* a good man."

Dana and Mantey agree with the present writer's conclusion that this sort of construction can be expressed in Greek under a regular rule. The substantive clause construction could be expressed by *ἵνα* with the subjunctive, the alternative form above being expressed in Greek, as in English, by an infinitive construction." Thus the Greek equivalents of the examples above would be as follows:

Direct statement: *υἱέ, ἴσθι ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος.*

Indirect (substantive clause): *κελεύω τὸν υἱόν μου ἵνα ᾖ ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος.*

Indirect (infinitive): *κελεύω τὸν υἱόν μου εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἄνθρωπον.*

This principle may be most simply

illustrated, as above, by using the indirect form of a statement of direct discourse—in the former illustrations, with the verb of the direct discourse in the indicative mood; in the latter, with the verb of the direct discourse in the imperative mood. However, from these rather obvious illustrations the principle may be extended from actual indirect discourse to include indirect statements after such verbs as knowing, thinking, feeling, beseeching, etc., and after certain nouns and adjectives. Abbott-Smith, Burton, Blass, and Robertson admit the existence of these constructions." What they fail to do is to point out the principle involved—viz., that these constructions with *ἵνα* are the indirect form of a statement whose (actual or hypothetical) direct form would have its verb in the imperative or subjunctive mood.

It is in the nature of some of the ideas expressed by the *subjunctive* mood that they should be expressed indirectly by some construction other than substantive clauses. When, however, such a thought is stated indirectly as a substantive clause, a *ἵνα* clause is regularly used. The following New Testament passages appear to be examples of this type:

Matt. 14:36 *παρεκάλουν αὐτὸν ἵνα μόνον ἀψῶνται τοῦ κρασπέδου τοῦ ἱματίου αὐτοῦ.* "They were beseeching him (to the effect) that they might only touch the hem of his garment." The postulated original idea, "Permit us to touch the hem of thy garment", or, "May we touch the hem of thy garment?"

Mark 5:18 *παρεκάλει αὐτὸν ὁ δαίμονιστος ἵνα μετ' αὐτοῦ ᾖ.* "He who had been demon-possessed was beseeching him (to the effect) that he might be with him." Original idea, "Let me be with thee."

John 11:50 *συμφέρει ὑμῖν ἵνα εἰς ἄνθρωπος ἀποθάνῃ ὑπὲρ τοῦ λαοῦ . . .* "It is better for you that one person should die for the people . . ." In direct form, the thing which is "better

¹¹ See above.

¹² The subjunctive mood is regularly used in these substantive clauses as in the purpose clauses. No special notice need be taken in this article of the occasional use of the future indicative.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, p. 131.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 298.

for you" would be something such as, "One person ought to die for the people", or "One person should die for the people".¹⁸

Allowing, then, that not all the uses of the subjunctive are subject to being written indirectly in a substantive clause, the following may be given as the SECOND BASIC HYPOTHESIS of this article:

The majority of Ινα substantive clauses in the New Testament are clauses whose content is the indirect statement of an idea which, if stated directly, would have its verb in the imperative or subjunctive mood.

The above hypothesis does not, however, include quite all of the Ινα substantive clauses in the New Testament. There seems to be one other type, in which the idea seems to be practically a simple future idea. Here the direct statement would be in the future indicative, and therefore the clause would ordinarily be expected to be expressed by *ὅτι* with the future indicative; although in some cases the idea may be thought of as being a subjunctive idea.¹⁹

The four probable examples of this type of clause in the Fourth Gospel are as follows:

12:23 ἐλήλυθεν ἡ ὥρα ἵνα δοξασθῇ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. "The hour is come that the Son of Man should be glorified."

13:1 εἰδὼς ὁ Ἰησοῦς ὅτι ἦλθεν αὐτοῦ ἡ ὥρα ἵνα μεταβῇ ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου τούτου . . . "Jesus, knowing that his hour had come that he should depart from this world . . ."

16:2 ἔρχεται ὥρα ἵνα πᾶς ὁ ἀποκτείνας ὑμᾶς δόξῃ . . . "There comes an hour that everyone who kills you will think . . ."

16:32 ἔρχεται ὥρα καὶ ἐλήλυθεν ἵνα σκοποσθῇτε . . . "An hour is coming and is come that ye will be scattered . . ."

¹⁸ Abbott-Smith (*op. cit.*, p. 217) refers to this passage as an example of the substantive clause "after words expressing expediency, etc."

¹⁹ It may be significant that this type of clause seems to be found only in the Johannine books, except for one example in Matthew.

These examples, all referring to an "hour", are obviously not purpose clauses nor result clauses, in which case a further identification of the "hour" seems to be needed. They are almost, if not quite, the equivalent of temporal clauses with *ὅτε* ("when") and the future indicative. This Gospel freely uses *ὅτε*, however, and sometimes with the idea of "the hour has come"—e.g., 4:21, 5:25, 16:25; so it may be valid to see in these Ινα clauses, as substantive clauses, a further identification of the "hour" rather than a temporal idea. The Ινα clauses in the above examples might then be given in direct form as follows: "The Son of Man will be glorified", "I will depart from the world", "Everyone who kills you will think . . .", and "Ye will be scattered".

Approximately half of the examples of Ινα substantive clauses expressing a future idea in Revelation are found after the verb ποιεῖν.

A tentative list of the New Testament examples of Ινα substantive clauses expressing a future idea is as follows:

Matt. 18:14	John 16:32	Rev. 6:4	Rev. 13:15
John 11:37	I John 3:1	6:11	13:16
12:23	4:17	9:5	13:17
13:1	5:3	13:12	14:13
16:2	Rev. 3:9	13:13	19:8

To illustrate the principle involved, reference may be made to I John 5:3. In this passage, αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ, ἵνα τὰς ἐντολάς αὐτοῦ ποιῶμεν—"For this is the love of God, that we keep his commandments"—the Ινα clause seems clearly to be exegetical of "the love of God". It is not too easy to put the thought into direct form, but it seems to be something such as, "We will keep his commandments; this is the content of the love of God."

Rev. 3:9, ποιήσω αὐτοὺς ἵνα ἤξουσιν καὶ προσκυνήσουσιν ἐνώπιον τῶν ποδῶν σου—"I will make them that they

²⁰ Contra Winer, *op. cit.*, p. 355.

will come and worship before thy feet . . ."—is clearly a noun clause expressing an idea in future time. (The verb in this clause, it will be noted, is a future indicative.) The *ἵνα* clause could be directly stated, "They will come and worship", or perhaps with a declarative sense, "They shall come and worship".

Rev. 6:11, *ἐπρέθη αὐτοῖς ἵνα ἀναπαύσωνται ἔτι χρόνον μικρόν*—"it was said to them that they should rest yet a short time"—refers to the content of what was said, which is, stated directly, either "You will rest yet a short time", or possibly, "You may rest yet a short time." (The latter translation would place this example with the previously discussed type of *ἵνα* substantive clauses.)

The evidence of this list of references point to the **THIRD BASIC HYPOTHESIS** of this article:

A second and much smaller class of *ἵνα* substantive clauses in the New Testament are clauses which express indirectly an idea which, if stated directly, would have its verb in the future indicative.

There now remains to be presented the evidence from the New Testament upon which these three hypotheses are based. For this purpose, herewith is given a list of examples from the New Testament which seem rather clearly to be substantive clauses. A second list is given of examples which may be debatable but which merit consideration. These examples are taken from Moulton and Geden's *Concordance* but are not classified as substantive clauses in that work.

ἵνα SUBSTANTIVE CLAUSES

Matt. 4:3	Matt. 7:12	Matt. 20:33	Mark 6:12
5:29	8:8	24:20	6:25
5:29	10:25	Mark 3:9	6:41
5:30	14:36	5:23	6:56
5:30	16:20	5:43	7:26
7:1	18:6	6:8	7:32

Mark 7:36	Luke 7:36	John 15:12	Gal. 2:10
8:6	8:32	15:13	Col. 1:9
8:22	9:40	15:17	4:16
8:30	16:27	16:7	4:16
9:9	17:2	16:30	I Thes. 4:1
9:12	20:28	17:3	I Thes. 3:12
9:18	John 2:25	17:15	I Tim. 1:3
9:30	4:8	17:15	1:18
10:35	4:34	17:24	5:21
10:37	4:47	18:39	I John 2:27
10:48	6:29	19:31	3:11
10:51	6:39	19:38	3:23
11:16	6:40	Acts 17:15	4:21
11:28	8:56	19:4	5:16
12:19	11:50	I Cor. 1:10	II John 5
13:34	11:50	4:2	6
14:35	13:29	4:3	6
15:21	13:34	16:12	III John 4
Luke 4:3	13:34	16:12	Rev. 9:4
6:31	15:8	II Cor. 9:5	9:5
7:6			

ἵνα CLAUSES—POSSIBLY SUBSTANTIVE

Matt. 12:16	Luke 8:31	John 17:2	II Cor. 12:8
20:21	10:40	Acts 16:36	Gal. 2:9
20:31	18:39	27:42	Eph. 2:10
26:41	18:41	Rom. 15:31	6:19
26:63	21:36	16:2	Phil. 1:9
27:20	22:32	I Cor. 7:29	2:2
27:32	22:46	7:34	Col. 2:2
28:10	John 1:27	7:35	4:3
Mark 3:12	5:7	10:33	4:17
5:10	9:22	14:1	II Thes. 3:1
5:18	9:39	14:5	3:2
13:18	11:53	14:12	I Tim. 1:16
14:38	11:57	14:13	Tit. 2:12
15:11	12:10	16:10	3:8
Luke 1:43	13:15	II Cor. 1:17	

It is to be insisted once more that the above examples are not to be considered substantive clauses only if it is impossible to give them a purposive sense. Rather, both meanings should be equally considered and the interpretation given which best suits each example. There may, of course, be a difference of opinion concerning individual examples without invalidating the general claim.

Some discussion of a few of the examples in the above list may well be given, in order to illustrate the process of reasoning.

Matt. 4:3, *εἰπὲ ἵνα οἱ λίθοι οὗτοι ἄρτοι γένωνται*—"Say that these stones should become bread", or, "Tell

these stones to become bread"—deals with the *content* of what is to be said, not the *reason* why something should be said." The ὡς clause is therefore a substantive clause, used as the direct object of the verb "say", not a purpose clause.

Luke 6:31, καθὼς θέλετε ὡς ποιῶσιν ὑμῖν οἱ ἄνθρωποι—"just as you wish that men (should) do to you"—deals with the *content* of the wish, answering the question, "What do you wish?" The hypothetical direct form of the "that" clause might be, "Oh, that men would do to me (thus)!" A purpose clause here would give the absurd idea that wishing would *serve the purpose* of inducing men to act in a certain manner. This example is therefore a ὡς substantive clause.

John 2:25, οὐ χρεῖαν εἶχεν ὡς τις μαρτυρήσῃ—"he did not have need that anyone should testify"—is an example of a ὡς clause explaining the content of a noun. The content of the "need" which "he did not have" is, "Someone must testify". The passage is obviously not setting forth the purpose of the need.

I Cor. 4:2 reads, ζητεῖται ἐν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις ὡς πιστὸς τις εὐρεθῇ—"it is sought in stewards that one (i.e., anyone, any steward) be found faithful". The "that" clause refers to the *content* of what is sought, not the reason why it is sought. The passage could be paraphrased, using a direct statement, "What is sought in stewards? Namely, he ought to be faithful (or, He must be faithful)." If the "that" clause were a purpose clause, it would be necessary to have something else stated as the object of the search. The thought would then be to the effect that "(Something or other) is sought for in stewards in order that they may be found faithful." This is clearly not

the meaning of the passage in question.

With these criteria for judging between substantive and purpose clauses after ὡς it will not be necessary to depend upon the nondescript classification of "non-final clauses after various verbs of wishing, striving, exhorting, saying, commanding, etc., and other exegetical and object clauses". Indeed, one of the failures of Burton's classification is due to the fact that a ὡς clause after such verbs might in some instances be a purpose clause, in other instances a substantive clause. For example:

Substantive clause: "Plead with him that he should be good."

Purpose clause: "Plead with him, in order that he may be good" (i.e., "... in order that your pleading may serve the purpose of helping him to be good.")

The verb "to say" generally requires an object. Therefore a ὡς clause in the predicate of the verb "to say" will generally be an object clause unless there is something else to serve as the object. For example:

Substantive clause: "Say to this stone that it become bread." (Luke 4:3).

Purpose clause: "Say the proper words to this stone, in order that it may become bread."

With the phrase "the proper words" supplied to serve as the direct object of "say", the ὡς clause may still be interpreted, however, either as a substantive or as a purpose clause. Interpreted as a substantive clause, the clause would be in apposition with the object of the verb, giving the meaning, "Say the proper words to this stone—namely, that you want it to become bread." In such a case the choice of meanings would be a matter of interpretation, just as is the case sometimes in determining whether a ὅτι clause is to be understood as a causal or a substantive clause. The verb "to pray", on the oth-

* Contra Winer, *op. cit.*, p. 351. But Winer unwarrantedly supplies the words "a word of power" as the object of "say".

er hand, may or may not take an object. Therefore in most instances of a *ἵνα* clause after the verb "to pray" it will be a matter of interpretation as to whether it is a purpose clause—"Pray, in order that this may come to pass"—or a substantive clause—"Let this be the content of your prayer." In many, if not most, of these instances in the New Testament, the sense seems to favor a substantive clause.

Up to this point, the discussion has dealt only with *ἵνα*. The related word *ὥς* is found in the New Testament approximately 55 times, which is less than eight percent as often as *ἵνα*. Four of these instances seem definitely to be in substantive clauses; these are Matt. 8:34; Luke 7:3, 11:37; and Acts 23:20. The following additional instances are worthy of consideration in this classification:

Matt. 9:38	Luke 24:20	Acts 9:2
Mark 3:6	Acts 8:15	23:15
Luke 10:2	8:24	25:3

The fact that the grammarians have been slow to recognize the nature of *ἵνα* substantive clauses apparently implies that they have tacitly assumed that a statement in the imperative or subjunctive mood would be given in indirect form by some other means. As a matter of fact, an examination of the New Testament would reveal that an infinitive construction is quite commonly used for this purpose.

With the two possible alternatives for expressing these ideas, the question might arise as to whether any reason could be given for using one construction in preference to the other in specific instances. In many instances of *ἵνα* substantive clauses there is no clear reason why this construction should have been preferred to the infinitive construction except that the writer simply chose to express it that way. There are, however, two possible

reasons for giving the *ἵνα* clause preference in some instances. First, if the subject of the verb in the substantive clause is not the same as the object of the verb governing that clause, then the infinitive construction might be less desirable, possibly being somewhat cumbersome; e.g., John 18:39, *ἔστιν δὲ συνήθεια ὑμῖν ἵνα ἕνα ἀπολύσω ὑμῖν*—"there is a custom with you that I should release one to you". An infinitive here would be translated, "There is a custom with you for me to release one to you". (See also I John 2:27, etc.) In other instances the writer may have desired to place emphasis upon the subject of the verb in the *ἵνα* clause, which may be the case in one of Paul's rare usages of the construction, I Cor. 1:10, *παράκαλῶ δὲ ὑμᾶς . . . ἵνα τὸ αὐτὸ λέγητε πάντες, καὶ μὴ ᾗ ἐν ὑμῖν σχίσματα*—"And I beseech you . . . that you all say the same thing and that there be not divisions among you". Moulton refers to I Cor. 14:5, in which the verb *θέλω* is followed by both the infinitive and the *ἵνα* substantive clause, and suggests that there may be found a greater urgency in the *ἵνα* clause than in the infinitive construction, which he says is demanded by the meaning of the passage."

Assuming, therefore, that the substantive clauses of the type under discussion may be expressed by *ἵνα* and the subjunctive mood, the question arises as to whether these ideas could also be expressed in a *ὅτι* clause, preserving as Machen puts it, "the same mood and tense as those which stood in the direct discourse lying back of the indirect".²⁰ An inspection of the *ὅτι* substantive clauses in the New Testament, in which the present writer was generously assisted by several of his students, brought to light only

²⁰ Moulton, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

²¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 139.

two types of construction where the verb in such a clause was not in the indicative mood. One type was the idiom of strong negation, οὐ μή with the aorist subjunctive, which is not properly a subjunctive idea; the other was instances such as John 9:11 and Rom. 3:8, where ὅτι merely introduces a direct quotation and is not itself to be translated. This would seem to be additional evidence for the hypothesis presented in this article, that a ὅτι substantive clause expresses indirectly an idea of the indicative mood, while ideas of the subjunctive and imperative moods would similarly take ὅτι with the subjunctive mood.

CONCLUSIONS

In order to bring the foregoing discussion down to the level of practical application to the exegesis of the New Testament, some practical results may be pointed out.

If the hypothesis set forth in this article be accepted, the following outline of the uses of ὅτι clauses in the New Testament may be set forth as follows:

I. Purpose clause ("telic" or "final" use). Answers the question, "Why?" ὅτι is to be translated "in order that". Examples: Mark 3:10, Luke 5:24, Rom. 14:9. (ὅπως is similarly

used in the New Testament, but less frequently than ὅτι. Examples: Matt. 2:8, Acts 25:26.)

II. Clause of conceived result (infrequent use). Possible future result; to be distinguished from the more common ὥστε with the infinitive result clause. Examples: Rom. 11:11, I John 1:9 (?).

III. Substantive clause (noun clause). Answers the question, "What?" Deals with content rather than purpose. ὅτι is to be translated "that", in the same sense in which ὅτι is translated "that". (ὅπως is occasionally thus used in the New Testament; e.g., Matt. 8:34, Acts 23:20.) This type of clause is an *indirect* statement, or the extension of that idea, whose *direct* form would fall into one of the two following classes:

A. A statement in the imperative or subjunctive mood. Examples: Mark 5:43, John 4:8, II Cor. 9:5.

B. In a few instances, a statement in the future indicative (like a ὅτι clause), although perhaps closely related to a subjunctive idea. Examples: Matt. 18:14, Rev. 6:4.

Upon this foundation, the task of the exegete is to use his own experience with the Greek New Testament, together with the standard reference commentaries upon that text, to give the best interpretation to each passage.

Our Silver Anniversary

J. HAROLD GREENLEE

The current school year is the twenty-fifth year of Asbury Theological Seminary. Such an anniversary by no means implies that the seminary has arrived at its ultimate goal; nevertheless it may be a proper time to make an alumni retrospect which will afford some measure for estimating the progress which the school has made through these years.

The first alumnus of Asbury Theological Seminary was the single graduate of the class of 1924. After a class of two in 1925, the first woman to be graduated from the seminary was the only member of the class of 1926. It is in accord with the seminary's emphasis upon world-wide evangelization that the first foreign-born alumni were two members of the class of 1927, who are thus numbered among the first ten graduates of the seminary.

From the small beginning of one alumnus the first year, classes increased to the extent that the one hundredth alumnus was graduated ten years later, a member of the class of 1934. Six years later a member of the class of 1940 became the two hundredth alumnus. The class of 1946 produced the three hundredth alumnus; and commencement of 1948, only two years later promises to see the four hundredth alumnus graduated.

Accreditation of the seminary by the American Association of Theological Schools in June, 1946, was of primary significance for the seminary and its alumni; and the first fully accredited class was graduated in 1947. This class was also the first class to be graduated after the seminary had received the approval of the University Senate of the Methodist Church.

A further indication of maturity of age is the fact that the present student body contains the first two "second generation" seminarians. The first of these to enter was the son of a member of the class of 1944, the other being the son of a member of the class of 1927.

Until 1947, the only academic degree granted by the seminary was the degree of Bachelor of divinity. With accreditation, however, the curriculum was enlarged to include the degree of Master of Religious Education, a two year course intended particularly for women who wish to work in the field of Christian education. The class of 1947 included four women who are the first to receive the M.R.E. degree from the seminary.

Within a quarter century the size of the graduating classes of Asbury Theological Seminary has increased from one, in 1924, to 37 in 1947, composed of graduates of 12 colleges and representing eight denominations: while more than 60 students have applied for degrees in the class of 1948. A total of 357 academic degrees have now been granted. The places of service of these alumni are many and varied. Most, of, them are pastors and evangelists. Forty of the alumni served as chaplains in the armed forces of the United States during the recent war. Approximately fifty are missionaries or are preaching in other nations. About fifteen are teachers. This ministry is truly world-wide, with alumni serving many denominations and organizations in forty-two states and in twenty-one other countries and colonies of the world.

Some Problems In Contemporary Religious Education

HAROLD C. MASON

It is the purpose of this article to present and examine three outstanding problems in the field of religious education. These are: the problem of naturalism, the problem of ecumenicalism, and the problem of secularism. As treated herein it is assumed that these problems take root in common soil.

Why are these patterns of thought designated as problems? They are so designated for the reason that their presence in the religious education movement of our time tends to occasion tensions which hinder or frustrate progress. For conservatives the obtrusions of these doctrines compels unceasing vigilance to prevent their infiltration into agencies and methods consecrated to the perpetuation of the Gospel message. Under various guises and veiled in language requiring the most discriminating intelligence naturalism, a liberal ecumenicalism, and outright secularism appear in leadership training texts, curricula for week-day schools of religion, and bibliographical material such as is used in theological seminaries.

It must be borne in mind that in education theory controls practice, and therefore invading or infiltrating theories are problems. They are "something thrown forward" which must be dealt with fairly and decisively.

NATURALISM

Naturalism in religious education rules out the supernatural. It is representative of the age-old effort to exalt

man and reduce God to the dimensions of man's reason. To attempt to rid the Christian world of the concept of God is too bold and gigantic an undertaking to be accomplished in a generation. It requires patience and persistence to persuade the theological mind, trained in the intricacies of logical thought, that there can be the theologian without theology. Perhaps because the incongruity was so obvious theologians of preceding generations hesitated to become the protagonists of an outright atheism, however much they may have been concerned to emphasize and project a concept of nature at whatever cost to the concept of God.

In his notable work, *Faith and Nurture*, Professor H. Shelton Smith of Duke University defines the naturalism of the nineteenth century in terms of several major trends, such as: divine immanence; growth; the goodness of man; the historical Jesus. In this analysis he is referring to what may be termed the romantic movement in theology as it became identified with the philosophy of Darwin.¹ To this movement the term "modernism" has been applied. That term is being supplanted by the word "liberalism" which sometimes connotes an out and out humanism and naturalism in theology and in religious education.

The doctrine of divine immanence, as projected by the romantic school,

¹ Smith, H. Shelton, *Faith and Nurture* (New York: Scribner's, 1942), pp. 4-26.

identifies God with the very essence of nature in what has been defined as "the higher pantheism." The growth theory in religious education is the concept of Horace Bushnell in his intense reaction against revivalism, as amplified and adapted to the Darwinian evolutionary hypothesis religiously by Coe and secularly by John Dewey. The doctrine of the innate goodness of man grew out of an inimical attitude toward the doctrine of the fall of man and of human depravity, and took root in the pantheistic concept of the nature of man. The liberal emphasis upon the historical Jesus is based upon a naturalistic concept of the person of Christ.

For the thoroughgoing realist and naturalist any attempt at compromise with traditional views in religion is distasteful. They repudiate all vague and shadowy vestiges of mysticism such as are suggested by the romantics in a doctrine of transcendence and an interest in "occult speculations" as to life after death. To the naturalist, God is whatever makes the universe "go"; he is the universe. Bower defines God as "running through the structures and processes of the universe".² Chave charges that it is "a useless oversimplification" to posit a personal God. He regards it as irreligious to define spiritual as anything "outside the natural and observable processes of life".³

The effect of these views, were they adopted, upon religious education would be, of course, revolutionary. A basic educational premise with the naturalist in religious education is that indoctrination is not education; that the curriculum as hitherto known must be discarded; that transmissive teach-

ing is archaic; that the church must assume a character which identifies it completely with its greatest foe in every age, unbelief. The church is to succeed by ceasing to be, which is at best a sort of Schopenhauerian conquest of evil. Thus the lion and the lamb are made at last to lie down together, the feat being accomplished (as some one has said) by the lion swallowing the lamb.

ECUMENICALISM

Another significant problem in the field of religious education is ecumenicalism. Minds whose disposition to religion is limited to philosophy possess the philosopher's passion for unity. They must bring the light of reason to sharp focus upon a rational universe. Their concept of universality, if carried to its logical conclusions, would mean the breaking down of all barriers of conviction, of culture, of race, or status, of property, of nationality, of faith, among people. That this may be a negative process involving the disintegration of life itself does not appear to such thinkers. That loyalties and choices are inherent in the nature of things, vegetation having proclivity for soils, metals for magnetism, birds of a feather for each other, beasts of the forest for their mates, does not seem to have occurred to them. That the heart of the home is loyalty and fidelity, and that one's country is an extension of his home; that the heart of the Christian faith is devotion, is entirely ignored. By some hypostasis of ideas the abuses and perversions of loyalty seem to them to be the loyalties themselves, so that all convictions and preferences become for them but harmful emotional states. If one expresses a conviction he is said to be controlled by his emotions, at the expense of his reason.

The ultimate goal of this breaking down of all distinctions seems to be the realization of one world, one religion, one race. This unification, for

² Bower, William Clayton, *Christ and Christian Education* (Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1943), p. 56.

³ Chave, Ernest, *A Functional Approach to Christian Education* (University of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 130.

some reason not clear to all thinkers, seems to be the far off divine event toward which the whole creation moves. It appears to be the religious passion, the modern crusade of naturalistic religionists. This emphasis places Dr. John Dewey, whose work has been accepted as practically *ex cathedra*, in the anomalous rôle of the greatest religious leader of his age, one who is destined to be the great patron saint of all time. Desire for such fame has never been ascribed to Dr. Dewey. It is his friends in religious education who are thus seeking his canonization.

It is the subtleties of this liberal ecumenicalism which afford opportunities for shafts to be hurled at non-conformists. A bit of clear thinking concerning the nature of the Church is necessary here. Because the church universal is a great spiritual reality and as such appeals to every true believer, it is unpleasant to be taunted with disloyalty to it. The true church universal excludes no one on the ground of race or nationality. It excludes many on the ground of unbelief and rebellion against God, for just as the man-made ecumenical church of the liberal requires a great measure of unanimity so does the true church universal.

Fortunately, persons are born into the church universal and find themselves by nature at one with it. The new ecumenicalism requires the abandonment of beliefs which unfit one for perfect fellowship with persons of all faiths.

How does the problem of ecumenicalism relate to religious education? It appears in religious education often under the guise of an inclusive policy which might better be named a pragmatic policy. It is hoped by training courses and otherwise to choke out a recalcitrant conservative element in the churches through new doctrinal and practical approaches in religious education. It is also hoped that the

emotionalized opinions of the rank and file may be modified so that they will continue to give their support financially and morally as they witness the disappearance of their distinct denominations on a liberal basis.

The use of the word "community" and the expression "world community" by contemporary leaders in religious education demands our attention. The term church universal is used in a sense quite different from its Biblical connotations. If the world community is to be truly Christian, certainly the ideal is precious to every Christian. It embodies the missionary vision and purpose of the church. However, there has crept into the vocabulary of religious education the term "supranational". Of course our faith transcends national boundaries, but it does not necessarily imply an attitude of anything like sedition on the part of a Christian. Neither should a true ecumenicalism suggest a fusion of the Christian religion with other ethnic faiths.

Paul E. Johnson discusses frankly the meaning of "world community" in the religious sense as one religion. Referring to the "supranational" religions of the world he says that there is a growing sense of community among them; that there are beginnings of "mutual recognition and cooperation" between Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism. He cites the acceptance of all these faiths by the International Mission Council in 1928 as "witnesses of man's need of God and allies in our quest of perfection." He quotes Hocking as saying that the way to a world faith is not through "radical displacement" but through discovering "the saving truth in each religion".

Ecumenicalism becomes a problem

*Johnson, Paul E., *Psychology of Religion* (Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1945), pp. 256-57.

when pressed to the point of breaking down loyalty to the Christian faith itself. This writer is not alone in fearing that the movement has today reached this stage.

SECULARISM

The third problem is that of secularism. This problem is forced by the other two. There are two opinions involved in the question of secularism. The first one is that the public schools should become religious. This is to be achieved by the "liberalization" of religious education to the point that fusion with public education is possible. The second approach is a very candid one and involves the notion that good public education is good religious education. The question is being raised in various circles, if Christianity be watered down to secular levels why fight to maintain the term "religious" at all?

Dr. Ernest Chave in his frankly secular approach to religion, *The Functional Approach to Christian Education*, maintains that religious education will become increasingly attractive as it "draws into cooperative relationship leaders and workers from all areas and interests of our complex world." The words "cooperative relationship" seem to preserve the idea of distinction between religion and secularism. A further word helps to clarify Dr. Chave's position: religious education must "speak in terms which honor the natural processes, and which integrate the learnings from all of life." He objects to what he terms the "departmentalization of religion" by even the most liberal ecumenical agencies. He feels that people are not justified in maintaining "traditional ideas and practices as the basis of organization and cooperation".

The Eakins, in their recent book *The Pastor and the Children* frankly

acknowledge the implications of the naturalistic trend in religious education by heading the last chapter, "How Avoid Being Secular?" Dr. Eakin comments in this chapter on what he apparently feels to be the smugness of evangelicals. He infers that the frequent use of the name of God and of Christ is insisted upon by some people as indicative of the religious nature of the teaching. As against this view he says that any teaching which puts Christian principles at work in life is religious. Then by further statements he sustains what the writer of this article has maintained, namely, that there is a distinct relationship in the thought patterns of naturalism, liberal ecumenicalism, and secularism. He diverts from the discussion of secularism to say that he one time heard a woman missionary from India give a talk to Sunday-school children in a large suburban church. She depicted the ignorance and degradation of India and recited some horrors. Dr. Eakin felt that she very unfairly and one-sidedly presented the Gospel to these children. She referred frequently to "our God" and "our Jesus", ignoring the riches of India's own spiritual inheritance in Gandhi, Nehru and Tagore. He wished that those children were getting something else that morning "than a picture of a foreign people who weren't 'nice' and wouldn't be until we took them *our Jesus*". So disturbed was he by it all that he says he was not concerned about where the line should be drawn between the religious and the secular. Contact with everyday life and needs, he maintains, is of prior importance to any "guarding of religion's preserves from contamination by the secular".

According to Dr. Eakin any pastor who is concerned about the religious and the secular is encouraged to set his fears of secularization aside and plunge ahead, for there is a good chance that after several years the dilemma of the religious or the secular

* Chave, Ernest J., *op. cit.*, pp. 130-31.

will have more or less disappeared.*

From the foregoing, it appears that Christian religious education faces a trinity of foes in naturalism, liberal ecumenicalism, and secularism; and that these three are in their essential tendency *one*. Moreover, the threat from these viewpoints is acute primar-

*Eakin, Mildred Moody, and Frank, *The Pastor and the Children* (New York: MacMillan, 1947), pp. 164-65, 171.

ily because they are espoused by those within the church. They are being utilized as shaping principles in the education of leaders for religious education, both lay and professional. To those who espouse and love the historic Christian faith the situation emphasizes the demand for a clear and vigorous evangelical theory and strategy, and for alertness lest the faith which has been committed to the saints be pushed aside without their realizing what is taking place.

THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER

(Continued from Page 145)

Harold Greenlee, B.D., Ph.D., Professor of New Testament Greek; C. Elvan Olmstead, B.D., Ph.D., Professor of Christian Education; Claude H. Thompson, A.B., B.D., (Resident work completed for Ph.D., Drew University), Professor of Doctrine; James D. Robertson, Ph.D., Professor of Practical Theology.

The Thanksgiving offering for the building fund of the seminary was initiated at the chapel and inaugural services on October the 22nd, when the faculty, student body, and friends contributed approximately \$3,000. This offering was preliminary to the annual Thanksgiving appeal through the Pentecostal Herald.

A twenty-four hour vigil of prayer was held by the faculty and student body on October the 15th. We request the friends of the seminary to remember us daily in prayer. We need money for the building program and other urgent needs of the seminary, but more than money, we need prayer.

The annual Ministers' Conference will be held February 24 to 26. The Lizzie H. Glide lectures for the conference will be delivered by Bishop Fred P. Corson and Bishop L. R. Marston. Reservations for entertainment should be sent to Dean W. D. Turkington, Asbury Theological Seminary, Wilmore, Ky.

Regenerate Or Unregenerate?

A Study in Romans 7:7-25

CLAUDE A. RIES

The Ethiopian eunuch, returning from worshipping in Jerusalem, stopped his chariot in mid-desert and began reading aloud the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah. Ere long Philip, the Spirit-filled man, joined him and inquired whether the reader understood what he was reading. "Of whom speaketh the prophet this?" inquired the eunuch, "of himself or of some other?"

As one turns to Romans 7:7-25 the same question suggests itself. Of whom speaks the Apostle this? A number of answers have been given:

First, that the passage depicts an awakened, half-converted man. (The Scriptures speak of being awakened but are completely silent on being half-converted.) A second interpretation holds that it portrays the common, normal Christian life. (No doubt the life depicted in Romans 7:7-25 is an all too common one but it seems scarcely the normal life of a Christian according to New Testament standards.) A third view is that it describes the inner experience of the unregenerate man, the unsuccessful strivings of his better moral nature through law-keeping. Finally, it is held to mirror the regenerate man seeking deliverance from the power of sin in himself by keeping of the law.

Of whom speaks the Apostle this? Of the unregenerate man or of the regenerate man? The present study will seek to answer this question by a careful examination of (1) the passage itself (Romans 7:7-25); (2) the immediate context of the passage; and

(3) the passage in the light of Scripture outside the immediate context.

By grouping and paraphrasing the passage the thought becomes fourfold:

- 1) Verses 7-13. "If release from Sin means release from Law, must we then identify Law with Sin? No. Law reveals the the sinfulness of Sin, and by this very revelation stirs up the dormant Sin to action. But this is not because the Law itself is evil—on the contrary it is good—but that Sin may be exposed and guilt aggravated."
- 2) Verses 14-17. "This is what takes place. I have a double self. But my better self is impotent to prevent me from doing wrong."
- 3) Verses 18-21. "It is equally impotent to make me do right."
- 4) Verses 21-25. "There is thus a constant conflict going on, from which, unaided, I can hope for no deliverance. But, God be thanked, through Christ deliverance comes."

I

It will be helpful to set forth an analysis of outstanding words and phrases in the passage. (1) 'Law' (v. 7). Speaking generally, νόμος here and through most of the context (excepting vs. 21, 23) is the moral law combined with an understanding of the Mosaic Code. The law does three things: it enlightens the sinner's conscience, brings conviction of sin, and shows

need of salvation. The law can never save, bring deliverance or provide victory. (2) 'Finding occasion', ἀφορμή (vs. 8, 11). Securing a starting point, a spring board, a base of operation. Providing excuses for doing what one wants to do. Furnishing a starting point from which to rush into acts of sin. (3) 'Exceeding sinful', καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἁμαρτωλός, (v. 13). Sinful according to excess (lit.: to throw beyond). Hence the excesses of sin reveal its real nature. (4) 'Spiritual', πνευματικός, (v. 14). Spirit-caused. Spirit-given and hence like the Holy Spirit. (5) 'Carnal', σαρκινός, (v. 14). Mark on character; more emphatic than σαρκικός, "a creature of flesh". (6) 'Sold under Sin', πεπραμένος ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν (v. 14). This is the perfect passive participle of πωράσκω—made a slave under Sin. "Sin has closed the mortgage and owns its slave" (Robertson). One that has sold himself under sin, like a prisoner of war who has been sold as a slave. (7) 'Flesh', σὰρξ (v. 18). This term describes the man in his natural state, i.e., outside of grace. He identifies the self with the flesh. (8) 'Is present', παράκειμαι (v. 21). Lies to my hand, or, is within my reach. (9) 'I do not . . . I do', πράσσω . . . ποιῶ (v. 15). πράσσω—put into practice. ποιέω—commit an act. (10) 'Inward man', ἔσω ἄνθρωπον (v. 22). My real self—after the inward man of the conscience, as opposed to the outward man. Compare: law of mind, the reflective intelligence, the inward man. (11) 'In my members', ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν (v. 23). This describes the flesh, organized and active in various directions; equals the σῶμα in detail. Not of my members but in members. Sin has its lodgment there but the flesh is destined unto, and must be claimed for, other and higher purposes. (12) 'Body of this death', σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου (v. 24). 'Body'—the realm in which sin reigns. 'This death'—the body as subject to sin is also under the

dominion of death. Thus it is a body doomed to die.

There are several facts emphasized by repetition in verses 7-25. First, the first personal pronoun 'I' is used 28 times. Second, the prominence of the word 'law', used 20 times. "Law and the soul are brought face to face with each other and there is nothing between them. Not until we come to verse 25 is there a single expression used which belongs to Christianity. And the use of it marks that the conflict is ended" (Sanday). Third, there is an entire absence of emphasis on the Holy Spirit who indwells the Christian believer.

Several outstanding qualifying facts are set forth, descriptive of the life of the person described in 7:7-25:

1. "Sold under Sin" (v. 14). This does not harmonize with the New Testament description of a 'born again' child of God. Compare I Corinthians 7:22, 23: "For he that is called in the Lord, being a servant, is the Lord's free man: likewise also he that is called, being free, is Christ's servant. Ye are bought with a price; be not ye servants of men." Compare with II Corinthians 5:17: "If any man be in Christ, he is a new creation: old things are passed away; behold, all things are become new."

2. The inability to do anything right (vs. 15f.). Compare here with I John 5:4: "Whatsoever is born of God overcometh the world: and this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith. Who is he that overcometh the world, but he that believeth that Jesus is the Son of God?" Where is faith or the recognition that Jesus is the Son of God or ability to overcome the world in the life of the one portrayed in Rom. 7:7-25?

3. Utter frustration is the experience of the man of 7:25. Notice verse 23 and 24 "in captivity under the law of sin." "Wretched man that I am! Who shall deliver me out of the body of this death?" Compare this with Galatians

1:4: "Our Lord Jesus Christ who gave himself for our sins that he might deliver us out of this present evil age." In verse 25 the man of 7:25 sees that deliverance through Jesus Christ our Lord. And there is no deliverance before verse 25!

4. Note the two imperatives of verse 23. "There are two imperatives (*vóuoi*) within the man: that of conscience, the other, that proceeding from the action of sin upon the body. One of these Imperatives is the moral law, 'Thou shalt' and 'Thou shalt not'; the other is the violent impulse of passion" (Sanday).

5. This benumbing sense of the utter futility and powerlessness of life cannot describe a New Testament Christian but does fit into the Apostle's life as a convicted Pharisee, driving him into "persecuting the Christians, as both a relief from his inward misery and a means of securing God's favor," which he came to realize he could not obtain by keeping or seeking to keep the law. Was not the vision on the way to Damascus an answer to his despairing cry of wretchedness? Were not the goads against which he had kicked the feelings of intense disgust with and despair regarding himself?

II

If Romans 7:7-25 depicts the experience of a regenerated person it makes the gospel as great a failure as the law in its reconstruction of human character, and it flatly contradicts the whole tenor of the New Testament relative to the nature and power of the 'born-again' child of God. The man living in the area described by Romans 7:7-25 could not, or, we trust, would not say, "Be ye imitators of me, even as I also am of Christ", (I Corinthians 11:1) as did the Apostle Paul. There are true Christians with controlled depraved tendencies (I Corinthians 3:1-3), but the person under the perfect mastery of the flesh, according to the New Testament, is a 'natural man, not having the Spirit'.

Note in this connection Jude 19 and Romans 8:9.

Daniel Steele says at this point: "In Romans 7:7-24 there is no term which implies the new birth or spirituality. In the whole context the Spirit does not appear on the field as one of the combatants. 'The inward man' is not the new man but the mind including the aesthetic sensibilities which admire the beauty of holiness while repudiating its obligation. The two parties to the contest are the moral reason antagonizing the depraved appetites and passions; the upper story of the house at war with basement on the plane of nature.

"The Greek Fathers during the first 300 years of church history unanimously interpreted this Scripture as describing a thoughtful moralist endeavoring without the grace of God to realize his highest ideal of moral purity. Augustine first followed this interpretation, then shifted to the position that it represented the regenerated in order to refute Pelagius who used a couple of verses (14, 22) for his theories. The trend of modern scholars, whether Calvinistic or Arminian, is now toward the view of the Greek Fathers".¹

Concerning the use of the present tense Sanday² notes that "the sigh of relief in verse 25 marks a dividing line between a period of conflict and a period where conflict is practically ended. This shows that the present tenses are in any case not to be taken too literally." Though Paul is writing in the present tense, he is projecting his mind back to the period before his conversion.

Another writer observes: "He [Paul] is continuing an argument to show that *under grace* a man is free from the power of sin. He has already said that the Christian has *died to sins*

¹ Daniel Steele: *Half Hours with St. Paul*, pp. 73f.

² W. Sanday: *J. C. C.: Romans*, p. 185.

and moves in the *new sphere of life*. He has compared him to a slave bought by a new master, and to a widow set free to marry again. It would stultify his whole argument if he now confessed that, at the moment of writing, he was a *miserable wretch*, a *prisoner to Sin's law*. He would have thought it quite abnormal that any Christian should feel so, and there is nothing in his own confessions elsewhere to lead us to suppose that, with all his sense of struggle and insecurity, he ever had such an experience as this after his conversion".¹

Stevens' comment at this point is: "In Romans 7:7-25 the apostle describes a certain inner conflict of principles under the first person. It can hardly be doubted that this description refers either directly or indirectly to his own life. The description is of one who under the operation of the Old Testament law has been awakened to a sense of his sin and of his need of forgiveness and renewal . . . This narrative reflects Paul's own moral history. He has passed through this moral struggle and experienced this sense of defeat in his best aspirations. It was only the manifestation of Christ in his true character as the Saviour from overmastering sin that terminated the conflict and brought harmony and peace into his life. I believe that it is in the experience thus depicted that we are to find the point of contact between his sudden conversion and his previous career. This inner conflict, with its resulting sense of failure and sin, was, in an important sense, a preparation for his conversion, and made the revelation of Christ to him productive of a radical change in his disposition and conduct".²

III

We close this discussion on Romans

¹ C. H. Dodd: *Moffatt N. T. Commentary: Romans*, pp. 107f.

² George B. Stevens: *The Pauline Theology*, pp. 12, 13.

7:7-25 with the translation (or paraphrase) of some of the outstanding verses in the passage by W. Sanday and A. C. Headlam.

"The blame cannot attach to the Law (v. 14). For we all know that the law has its origin from the Spirit of God and derives its character from the Spirit, while I, poor mortal, am made of frail human flesh and blood, sold like any slave in the market into the servitude of sin.

"It is not the law (v. 15) and not my own deliberate self, which is the cause of evil; because my actions are executed blindly with no proper concurrence of the will. I purpose one way, I act another. I hate a thing but do it.

"So that the state of the case is this (v. 17): It is not I, my true self, who put into act what is repugnant to me, but Sin which has possession of me.

"The will indeed to do good is mine (v. 18) and I can command it, but the performance I cannot command. For the actual thing that I do is not the good that I wish to do (v. 19); but my moral agency appears in the evil that I wish to avoid. For I am a divided being (v. 22). In my innermost self, the thinking and reasoning part of me, I respond joyfully to the law of God. But then I see a different law dominating this bodily organism of mine and making me do its behests. This other law (v. 23) takes the field in arms against the law of Reason and Conscience and drags me away captive in the fetters of sin, the Power which has such a fatal grip upon my body.

"Unhappy man that I am—torn with a conflict from which there seems to be no issue! This body from which proceed so many sinful impulses; this body which makes itself the instrument of so many acts of sin, this body which is thus dragging me down to death—How shall I ever get free from it? (v. 24).

"A Deliverer has come—Jesus Mes-

siah, our Lord (v. 25). Without His intervention, left to my own unaided self, the state I have been describing may be summarized: in this two-fold capacity of mine I serve two masters: with my conscience I serve the law of God; with my bodily organism the Law of Sin.'

* * *

From a purely Scriptural basis it

* Sanday and Headlam: *I. C. C.: Romans*, pp. 177, 178.

is apparent what is the answer to the question: "Of whom speaketh the Apostle this?" He is speaking of an unregenerate man striving through law-keeping to satisfy God's high claims on his life, but miserably failing in the attempt and yet seeing a bright gleam of hope in Christ "who gave himself for our sins, that he might deliver us out of this present evil world, according to the will of our God and Father: To whom be glory forever and ever" (Galatians 1:4, 5).

Book Reviews

The Realm of Personality, by Denison Maurice Allan. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1947. 249 pp. \$2.50.

It is always heartening to find a volume which seeks to overcome the sectarianism which has too frequently been characteristic of the discipline of psychology. In *The Realm of Personality* an author trained primarily in philosophy has endeavored to bring into closer relation, if indeed not into synthesis, the principal insights which form the cutting edge of both psychology and metaphysics. The work comprises the Sprunt Lectures delivered in Union Theological Seminary (Richmond, Virginia) in 1944.

The author has derived much from the wholesome iconoclasm in psychology for which his teacher, Gordon Allport is justly famous. The analytical section of the volume, comprising the two chapters treated in pages 17-79, is shaped by the freedom from narrow faddism which such a critical attitude toward the "schools" brings. In the treatment of "The Rival Views of Personality" and of "Levels of Motive in Personality" Allan reveals in his thinking a degree of social realism which seems to this reviewer much more inclusive than that accepted the current 'interpersonal' psychologies, and much more revealing of the profound issues which confront the individual in his social milieu.

The body of the work contains very much that we can appreciate, particularly from the point of view of the rôle of faith in the development of personality. Special emphasis is laid upon the manner in which dedicated personality—dedicated to either good or evil—can exert a transforming impact up-

on both individual and corporate life. Welcome, particularly, is the reverent regard with which the author speaks of the character and influence of Jesus; without presenting any formal Christology, he leaves the way open to a positive approach to the presentation of the Christian Evangel, whether within Christian society or in alien cultures. Those interested in religious psychology will sense here an absence of the indifferentism—and cynicism—which has been so fashionable in this field.

The student of ethics will appreciate the catalogue of ideas which have been most largely instrumental in the shaping of our civilization, given on page 154. It goes without saying that Allan is advocating no dynamism of abstract universals; he recognizes (correctly we think) that ideas become the frame of reference within which the transforming influence of personality can be exerted.

One feels, however, that the heart of the volume is the chapter under title "Creative Aspects of Personality." This section gathers into itself the chief thesis of the author, that the doctrine of levels (or more popularly, creative evolution) affords the world-view most compatible with both the Christian view of man and the integrative function of human personality. He recognizes that modern dynamic evolution is capable of a variety of interpretations, ranging from historic theism to non-theistic humanism. Therefore he is confronted with the task of resolving the paradox which Bergson, Morgan and Hughlings-Jackson have raised, namely that of relating the values which are alleged to

have emerged from the higher levels of creative synthesis to some form of cosmic support.

To those who are unsure at the point of the correctness of Bergson's neo-Heraclitianism, the volume raises the question of whether the author may not be seeking to sweep far too much into his net of the creativity of human personality. Few will doubt that the mental processes, conscious and subconscious, are integrative within the experience of the individual himself. Further, the human mind plays a significant rôle in the achievement of newer syntheses in societal living. Few would challenge Allan's contention that human creativity may be used of not used, according to the presence or absence of personal dedication. What may be questioned is, the basal assumption of continuity by which he seeks to relate man to a process, which seems to be considered as being in some sense an ultimate in itself.

The book ends with a highly practical chapter, "Brain and Personality" in which the controverted doctrine of 'mind energy' is explored historically, then restated in a purified form, so as to lend support to a view of immortality which is, in the opinion of this reviewer, suggestive but far from complete. From a study of the therapeutic functioning of mind, the author comes finally to a view of the healing ministry of Jesus which is a worthy challenge to the conclusions of contemporary naturalism.

This reviewer feels that *The Realm of Personality* merits a larger place among current reviews than has been given to date. While confessing some radical differences of opinion with the author, he is among those who would look upon the volume as a step in a wholesome direction.

HAROLD B. KUHN,
Professor of Philosophy of Religion,
Asbury Theological Seminary.

The Protestant Pulpit, by Andrew W. Blackwood. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1947. 318 pp. \$2.75.

Out of his long experience as a seminary professor and an adviser of parish ministers, Dr. Blackwood gives us an "anthology of master sermons representative of the Protestant pulpit from the Reformation to the present time." Part I contains sermons by such men as Luther, Wesley, Whitefield, Chalmers, F. W. Robertson, Macclaren, Spurgeon, and Jowett. Part II includes sermons from the pens of such men as Buttrick, Chappell, Macartney, Walter Maier, Niemöller, Scherer, and Weatherhead.

Although the compiler identifies himself with evangelical Christianity, as a reporter of historic Protestant preaching he draws upon sermons whose theological content will at times be at variance with orthodox Christian belief, as in the case of Channing the Unitarian. The author feels from the nature of the undertaking that he cannot afford to ignore altogether the works of these dissenters, who were pulpit-masters notwithstanding.

The subtitle, "An Anthology of Master Sermons," suggests the usual problem in a book of this nature. It is far from clear just what criteria were used to set these preachers apart from their fellows. One can think of absent names that might be recognized by some as belonging to this peer group. To account in part for his omissions, the author pleads lack of space. It appears from the foreword to the book that popularity was a major criterion of inclusion. Billy Sunday seems to have been included for this reason. Certainly it was not for any literary or homiletical excellence on his part. Not all of the sermons could have been selected because they represented the "best" of a man's work, for, says Dr. Blackwood, "I have kept away from those that appear in other collections" (p. 6). The basis of choice is the more to be won-

dered at when it is learned that "among the discourses of men now living, in a number of cases the wishes of the preacher have prevailed." It would be an improvement if the book were sub-titled "representative" instead of "master" sermons.

Seminary students as well as preachers wishing to improve their homiletical style will do well to study these discourses. To guide the student in his "laboratory" study of them, the compiler has appended a work sheet on "How to Study a Sermon." The brief biographical sketches at the end of the volume will add interest to the sermons. A most unusual service in a text of this kind is the appearance of small superior numbers at the beginning of each paragraph. These will greatly facilitate work in the study or classroom. For the layman who desires to learn the message of the Protestant pulpit historically to the present time, this book will prove an enlightening and fascinating guide.

JAMES D. ROBERTSON,
Professor of Applied Theology,
Asbury Theological Seminary.

A Functional Approach to Religious Education, by Ernest J. Chave.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947. ix, 168 pp. \$2.50.

This book by Ernest J. Chave, of the University of Chicago Divinity School, is one of the frankest statements of the naturalistic point of view in religious education that has appeared. Chave is no mere liberal, though he expresses the hope that liberals will work together with those holding his progressive views (145). He considers such organizations as the International Council of Religious Education largely traditional in basis, though they "do show tolerance" (143). The seven (he should have said eight) objectives of the International Council "imply indoctrination" (96), and are therefore out of

harmony with the basic principle that people become "free to enlarge their concepts" when they "recognize the fact that there is nothing fixed or final in theology" (9). For the naturalist, even the use of the word "God" is optional, but it may have value as a term referring to "the creative and sustaining forces of the universe" (7). The ox cart and witch doctors will no longer serve in religion (23). It would be, he thinks, a good thing to scrap static organizations and have humanistic centers of religion in every community (144).

The author admits that he has lost the faith which he once had in the gospel of salvation (8), and suggests that in our day it is futile for conservatives to construct Maginot lines (145). However, his approach is not wholly negative. To further the agelong quest for fuller living, he offers the outline of a curriculum for religious education based on his views. It is a carefully worked out plan, centering in the cultivation of sensitivity to values. It begins with the Bible, "to make the transition easier for those accustomed to Bible emphasis in church-school teaching" (149), as well as to give background for Biblical references. However, this is "a world not of one Book but of many significant books" (145). We might wonder what the reaction of the membership of the churches where this curriculum was tried out has been, now that the underlying philosophy of the plan has been published.

The emphasis that spiritual values should function in life and not merely be expressed in words is, of course, wholesome. But this approach is concerned so largely with personal-social growth on the horizontal plane that the question may well be asked why the church should have to be responsible for religious education at all. The fact is that Chave would like to see his sort of functional religion taught as a regular part of the program of the public schools (106). If this could be done

without the iconoclastic bias which he manifests, it would be a constructive factor, but hardly religious education as understood by the churches. The possibilities for building spiritual values into school life are exciting; but one shudders to think what would happen if this book were used as a basis for instruction in teachers colleges by professors so convinced of the limitations of traditional religion as is its author. There is a sense in which ethics may precede faith; but it is impracticable to attempt to retain Christian values in society without the living religion that bore them. Hope for the "new day" in religious education which Chave forecasts does not lie along his route.

C. ELVAN OLMSTEAD,
Professor of Christian Education,
Asbury Theological Seminary.

Medieval Islam, by Gustave E. von Grunebaum. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1946. 365 pp. \$4.00.

This book is not a narration of the political history of Islam. It attempts, rather, to measure the cultural achievement of the Mohammedan world as it relates itself to other and older cultures. It is pointed out that its achievement is remarkable, in view of the crudeness of its origin, since its answers to the elemental questions to mankind and its way of life satisfy about one-eighth of all mankind.

Religion has been the motivating force under which Islamic life has unfolded. "The Moslem world is at rest, and he is at rest within it." The West recognizes the supreme value of change, but the Moslem possesses a quality of repose and poise which developed out of his conception of a static world. His proper attitude is one of resignation and submission to the inevitable so that he may fit perfectly and naturally into the great preor-

dained scheme of things that embraces all mankind as well as all spiritual beings and the created universe.

Islam must be seen in its relation to a complicated world. For itself it had no past, but it freely took unto itself the historical backgrounds of the Greeks and Romans, the Persians and the Christians. Yet the Moslem had a feeling of superiority because he had incontrovertible knowledge that his was the final religion, the one and only truth, and that, while he was traveling the road to salvation and eternal beatitude, the unbelievers were heedlessly hurrying down to everlasting punishment. Nevertheless, he freely admitted and searched for any contribution from the outside that could be of any help. Thus foreign skills were encouraged, including those of the Christian physician, the Indian mathematician, the Persian administrator. While information, techniques, objects and customs were received from all quarters, Islam was very careful to eliminate or neutralize any element endangering their religious foundations.

The book is a study in the cultural orientation of Islam. Therefore it leaves out the political and economic aspects, save in the barest outline, and attempts an interpretation of the social structure as molded by the prime loyalties cherished by the Moslems. Chapters which deal with these major concerns are expositions of the Islamic doctrines of Revelation, Piety, Law and the State, the Social Order, and the Human Ideal. A significant aspect of Islamic thought is shown in their "creative borrowing" as portrayed in "Greece in the Arabian Nights." While the Moslem did not influence the fundamental structure of the Western world, he did enrich Western tradition in almost every area of human experience.

WILDER R. REYNOLDS,
Professor of Church History,
Asbury Theological Seminary.

The Philosophy of War and Peace,
by Albert C. Knudson. New York:
Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1947.
221 pp. \$2.00.

This book of four chapters summarizes the materials, historical and philosophical, which deal with the age-old problem of war. It breathes the spirit and optimism of the contemporary Christian humanism, which may be having a hard time to keep up its courage in the face of the gathering world gloom.

Chapter one is on the apologetic for war, outlining the popular rootage of the militaristic philosophy of war. This defends war, first, from the naturalistic viewpoint, including the biological and the psychological. Man is a war-like animal, under the biological law that life feeds on life. He is endowed with native pugnacity which is necessary in the struggle for existence. Second, there is the argument from the nature of the state with its absolute sovereignty; and, third, the argument from the functions of war. These emphasize the survival of the fittest, the moral and cultural values, and the material benefits derived from war. Another defender of war is said to be pessimistic theological anthropology. This is the evangelical position that evil and war are due to sin and the fall. It is rather disconcerting to an evangelical to find himself listed as a war apologist, if not a war monger.

Chapter two discusses the modern causes of war, including nationalism, imperialism, race superiority and overpopulation. Chapter three outlines the growth of the argument for world peace. This is valuable for its splendid summary of a dozen or more famous peace plans of the past.

We are brought to the heart of the matter in chapter four, entitled "The Road to World Peace." In this Knudson discusses the medieval idea of the universal state; the balance of power;

disarmament; the outlawry of war; absolute pacificism; and the world federation idea, including the League of Nations and the present United Nations Organization.

Perhaps the most patent thing the author has to say—and the most disturbing to an easy-going optimism—is that true peace must be a peace of the heart. It must be a "peace of justice, mutual understanding, goodwill, voluntary and cheerful cooperation." The realist is perhaps inclined to feel that these good graces were never in five thousand years of recorded history more conspicuous by their absence from human relations than at this moment.

How may this peace be achieved? We must sincerely desire it, and have profound faith that world peace is the divinely-appointed goal of human history. We must establish conditions under which defeated nations may cooperate voluntarily and cheerfully in the maintenance of universal peace. There must be natural aversion to pain and suffering, respect for dignity and sanctity of human life everywhere, and belief in human brotherhood. We might add that the millenium would dawn overnight if someone would show us how to get these desirable traits.

Up to this point the author has been speaking as a humanist. In the closing section he comes to a Christian philosophy of history. After all, he says, the cause is spiritual. The Christian religion must play an important rôle. This "involves spiritual recrudescence and improvement of human character." (Perhaps there are stronger terms that he could have used with good grace). "In the last analysis the truth is, 'Not by might, nor by power, but by my spirit, saith the Lord.'"

The volume is valuable for its insights into both the causes of war and the problems involved in its elimination. Its prescription for the solution of this burning question share the limitations of all speculative remedies;

Knudson's attempt is, however, a courageous one.

WILDER R. REYNOLDS,
Professor of Church History,
Asbury Theological Seminary.

Eyes of Faith, by Paul Sevier Minear.
Philadelphia: The Westminster
Press, 1946. 307 pp. \$3.00.

This volume is designed to preface Biblical theology by charting some of its presuppositions, axiomatic attitudes, and conviction. The sub-title, *A Study in the Biblical Point of View*, concisely states the purpose of the book which is an epistemological study that grew out of the author's quest for a proper interpretation of the New Testament. He discovered that he was the farthest from really understanding Jesus or the apostles when he aligned them with his own accumulated knowledge and fund of opinions. This insight led to the conviction that a sound Biblical interpretation can come only by a subjective and personal comprehension of the prophet's or apostle's viewpoint from within his own peculiar history. Dr. Minear asks, Can it be true that the strange historical frame of reference within which the apostle stood, the Biblical perspective, is the real history, and that objective history is a deviation from reality? The task of this volume is to substantiate the affirmative answer to this question, to "describe the angle of vision at the 'innermost center' of Biblical experience, and to re-create the view seen from that point of standing."

Kierkegaard's existential principles as applied to Biblical interpretation are evident throughout the book. There is a significant emphasis upon the complete disparity between Biblical affirmations and human reason, between eternity and human concepts of time, between Christianity and the world. Stress is placed upon man's basic egoism which sets up false gods, is re-

lated to a false history, and leads to paradoxical reflections and despair.

The Biblical point of view appeals from the standpoint of faith to faith alone. Its appropriation must be exclusively subjective for it was not written from objective knowledge to faith, or vice versa. Thus the Bible defies all dispassionate evaluation. This insoluble polarity between revelation and reason, between God's angle of vision and objective standards, is constantly discernable from the beginning to the end of the volume.

What is meant by the Biblical point of view? Dr. Minear feels that the Biblical writers did not have a unity of views, but they did have a common point of *viewing* which is based upon God's encounters with man. In the Bible, time is grounded in the purposes of God and progresses only as these purposes move toward fulfillment. Thus the "divine-human encounters" reveal a new angle of vision to man concerning the ground of his existence. God confronts man with the assertion that he alone appoints times and seasons. Man becomes conscious of his rebellion against God, and senses the contradictory purpose or fictitious autonomy which creates the evil character of his times.

True history is the autobiography of God. He "speaks through an event of history." Seen through the eyes of faith, the event reveals the light of God's promise or demand; but to the eyes of unbelief, eyes focused on horizontal or spurious history, the meaning is the opposite. "The revelatory event thus becomes the focal point of ever recurrent controversies between Biblical and non-Biblical perspectives."

Christ brings both histories to a dramatic meeting. He reveals to men who are blinded by illusory history their folly and opens the door to freedom through God's true history. When man responds to this Word in faith, his false history ends and true history be-

gins; he dies to himself and his world; he is born again. The cross is the turning point of the world "where God triumphed over all his enemies by manifesting in Jesus the Messiah the fulfillment of his promise and the gift of his salvation." The Christian, therefore, has a revolutionized perspective. He is suspended between two polar realities: he realizes that the end has come before the end.

The reviewer cannot help but appreciate the author's emphasis upon supernaturalism, upon the transcendence and sovereignty of God, upon the cross and redemption through Christ; nevertheless, from an orthodox point of view, this reader ventures to guess that many readers will be left cold at certain points, especially in the realms of epistemology, biblicism, Christology, and eschatology. It is the reviewer's opinion that Dr. Minear lays himself open to classification as an adherent to the "cult of the irrational." The dialectic between revelation and reason, between God's *καρπός* and objective history, leaves no room for the orthodox position that revelation may be super-rational but not irrational. This in turn poses its objectionable corollary that the Bible cannot be considered objective history. Dr. Minear relegates much of the Bible to the category of mythology and tradition with legendary accretions. He feels that its purpose is not to be objectively accurate but to mediate the Word of God to those whose vision is corrected by faith. "This orientation, of course, excludes Biblical writers from serious consideration by so-called objective or scientific historians." The author is vague concerning his views on the Person of Christ. He approaches an Adoptionist view by making a distinction between the life of Jesus prior to the Passion and the Messianic aspect of Christ during and after the Passion story. It is difficult to determine his attitude toward an actual pre-temporal or post-temporal existence of Christ,

for he interprets the term pre-existence to mean that through Christ "God is re-enacting in purer form his initial covenant with all creation." The statement that "the hub of all genuine history" is constituted in the story of Christ is well and good, but to say that this "story of Christ reaches from the advent of the Galilean prophet to his return as God's Messiah" leaves one bewildered as to just who this prophet was and where did his Messiahship commence?

The eschatology outlined in the *Eyes of Faith* makes the reader wonder whether the author claims some extra-Biblical or post-Biblical angle of vision, or whether he departs from his own thesis and sees through the eyes of Universalism. He draws a line of distinction between the Kingdom of Christ and the Kingdom of God, and seems to visualize other areas of creation beyond the range of the particular Christian history in which Jesus is the central figure. The Kingdom of God over-arches all creations and thus goes far beyond the confines of the Kingdom of Christ. "Faith that ultimately the Kingdom of God transcends even the Kingdom of Christ may thus evince faith in the possibility of final salvation for even the enemies of Christ; this faith prevents disciples from turning Christ into an idol and his community into an exclusive set of the saved."

Finally, Dr. Minear's concept of sin raises some questions. He states that, apart from a special revelation, man is hopelessly ignorant of God's will. This ignorance, which is "inherent in man's status as creature", leads to rebellion and vanity. Sin therefore becomes almost synonymous with ignorance, and that, in turn, with creatureliness. Why does Dr. Minear thus identify sin with finiteness? Such a view no doubt finds a basis in the nature of Dialectical Theology which emphasizes the disparity between revelation and reason; between God, the "Whol-

ly Other", and man, the creature. It is also one answer to the problem of social solidarity as related to sin. Whatever the real motive may be, the reviewer feels that such a concept of sin evidences a fundamental lack of appreciation for the moral will with which man is endowed. Salvation, according to the author's view, would not be so much a moral regeneration as a revelation whereby God makes man cognizant of his ignorance and restores to him true vision. Hence, salvation is equated with proper knowledge and proper perception within the eternal perspective.

In spite of these aberrations according to orthodox thinking, this book has positive value in that it incites both provocative and stimulating thinking. It gives an insight into the method of Biblical interpretation employed by Neo-Orthodoxy to those who may be interested in this recent, though important, school of theology. Even though, from the point of view of historic Christianity, *Eyes of Faith* is highly unsatisfactory at many points, it does act as a welcome antidote to conventional religious liberalism in other respects.

PAUL F. ABEL,
Senior, Asbury Theological Seminary.

Pocket Commentary on the Uniform Bible Lesson Series, for 1948, by the National Sunday School Association. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1948. 160 pp. \$.60.

Another annual Sunday School commentary makes its bow to the Christian public, this time in vest-pocket size. The issue for 1948 is prepared by a panel of four writers, Dr. H. H. Savage, Dr. Robert C. McQuilkin, the Rev. William Tapper, and Dr. Archer E. Anderson. The writers exercise great liberty of style and arrangement, so that the format is varied from quarter to quarter.

It is almost impossible to prepare a review of a work of this kind. A random sampling of the lessons yields the impression that the comments are selected from a rather narrow range of authorities, and that they are more conventional than imaginative. Probably the writers underestimate the ability of the median Sunday School group to consider the deeper aspects of biblical truth.

In favor of the manual is its loyalty to the Bible as the Word of God, and to the essentials of historic Christianity. A commendable feature of the lesson materials for the second quarter (by Dr. McQuilkin) is the list of "Personal Applications" placed at the end of each lesson. The values of this feature are reproduced in briefer form in the "Conclusions" at the end of each lesson in the fourth quarter.

This Commentary is not without its merits in an age which emphasizes streamlining of its techniques. The manual for 1948 is the initial attempt of this panel of writers. It represents a good beginning; possibly it can be deepened in future years.

HAROLD B. KUHN,
Professor of Philosophy of Religion,
Asbury Theological Seminary.

Keys to the Word, by A. T. Pierson. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, n. d. 163 pp. \$1.50.
The Message of Romans, by Robert C. McQuilkin. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1947. 178 pp. \$2.00.

Two recent publications by Zondervan, dealing with Bible study, may well be mentioned together. Both volumes are written from the evangelical or conservative point of view by mature Bible students, and are intended for popular reading or for the beginning student. Both of them direct attention to the Bible itself, by question, outline, and analysis, rather than talking about the Bible.

The first is a "book-by-book analysis" of the entire Bible. It begins with some excellent hints on "the laws of Bible study", in which the proper sequence of "search", "meditate", and "compare" is explained. The chief merit of the work is its concise and yet penetrating summarizations, without being superficial. It amply fulfills its purpose of being a *key*, not a commentary. Advanced students will also consult it with profit, both for its suggestiveness and for an epitomization of the conservative viewpoint. For each Bible book, the key-verse and key-word is given, followed by a one-paragraph characterization of the book. A more detailed description is then given and the chapter concluded by a very brief outline of the book.

Among the weak points to be noted is that the brevity often gives the impression that only one point of view is worth mentioning. For example the only comment about the authorship of the Epistle to the Hebrews is that it "is attributed to Paul." On the point of pure dogmatism, however, it is no worse than many expositions from the "liberal" point of view. Another feature of the book which will not appeal to all readers is the somewhat naive acceptance of types, symbolic numbers, and other figures. There is a tendency to read into the Old Testament accounts much that is New Testament, and even post-New Testament in origin. These features, however, do not detract seriously from the utility of the book for the busy but discriminating student.

The book on Romans is an exposition. The perusal of Paul's most important letter is conducted with a good degree of objectivity, plus a healthy reverence for the Book. No pronounced doctrinal bias is in evidence, no "hobbies" are ridden, and no fanciful "eisogesis" indulged in; this, in itself, is remarkable in so controversial a book as Romans. The avowed purpose of the book is "to help Christians dig into Romans for them-

selves, to enter into its inner spirit, to know the message and have it translated into life;" in this the author appears to be successful.

The text of the book is arranged like a series of class lectures with illustrative comment. Such, in fact, is the origin of the book; it grew out of lecture notes given to several generations of students at Columbia Bible College. A series of provocative questions direct attention to the text in question and there follows a concise, sane, and practical exposition. The illustrations serve to popularize the material and are well chosen. The book could have been improved by a table of contents and an index. Lacking also are footnote references and a bibliography, causing one to wonder how such omissions are to be reconciled with the stated purpose of being useful as a text book in Bible institutes, colleges, and seminaries. To be warmly appreciated, however, is the earnest, practical slant of the comments.

Both books are written from the distinctively Christian point of view; both are definitive and frankly, but not offensively, apologetic; both are constructive, sane, evangelical; they will help build Christian character.

GEORGE ALLEN TURNER
Professor of English Bible,
Asbury Theological Seminary.

How You Can Help Other People, by
Samuel M. Shoemaker. E. P.
Hutton & Co., New York, 1946,
189 p.p. \$1.75

"The basis of this book is profoundly Christian. The writer believes that Christ was the greatest psychologist that ever lived, and intuitively and spiritually anticipated what we know of the mind today. A brilliant Scotch theologian, Dr. G. A. Johnston Ross, once said, "Psychology crawls to catch up to the Christian Religion." The author shows the great need people

have today of being helped, and that in many cases nothing can reach the need except the deep interest and faith of some other human being; and that we should never leave anyone to the ministrations of science alone, medical or psychological.

In the chapter "What It Takes To Help People" the author sets forth the qualifications of the one giving help in a very interesting manner, and concludes the chapter with the statement: "One does not counsel amateur experimentation in so important a field; but one does ask for those who will learn all they can from others, and then learn more from experience and from working with God, till they become at least better trained and more skillful in the all-important work of helping people."

In the chapter "Understanding People" the Christian attitude and the sound theology of the author is contained in this splendid statement. "Only our faith in God, and His power to transform men, will give us the confidence to believe that human nature can be re-made, and that the Kingdom can come on earth. Christianity—make no mistake about it—does not hold a high view of human nature: it holds a low one. It has any amount of faith about how much can happen to a man when he lets God save him; but it has little hope for man as he is. We shall do a far better job of helping people if we adopt the two-fold Christian view of man at the outset: disillusionment about man as he is, great faith about man as he can be with the help of God."

Speaking of what fellowship does, he shows that the more people a man can live himself into, the larger the orbit and potential of his life, and that thereby his emotions are likely to be healthier. He gives three levels of our meeting with other people. The first is where they are merely objects; second where people are objects emotionally needful to us; and third, where

people become people to us—where they are ends, not means, where their lives become important to us.

Other chapters deal with helping people to keep normal, helping the physically sick, the mentally sick, the fearful, the defeated, the conscientious and self-deceived.

This book is very refreshing to the soul; it shows that psychology in the highest sense, is the proper application of the teachings of the Scriptures; that mere will power, without the aid of God, will fail. Every minister and Christian worker will find the book very profitable; in fact it would be well for everybody to read this book in this day when there is much frustration, and when the number of mentally ill is rapidly increasing.

G. R. TOMLIN,
Pastor, Wilmore Methodist Church,
Wilmore, Kentucky

Conditions of Civilized Living, by Robert Ulich. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1946. 251 pp. \$3.75.

Among the analyses of the contemporary world scene are to be found volumes from writers of a wide range of abilities and viewpoints. Most of them succeed in making some contribution of value to our understanding of the age. The fashion in reviewing such books nowadays is to speak of each in superlatives, until reviewing is in danger of falling into banality. This reviewer calls attention to this fact in order to prepare the reader for the unusually high praise which he feels he must in fairness give to Dr. Ulich's volume.

The thesis of the book is, that civilization must, if it is to survive, harness its major cultural activities to the two-fold task of encouraging the healthy development of individuals to the fullest degree of their capacities, and at the same time of achieving a balance between individualism and collectivism

which will encourage the emergence of a spirit of organic belongingness. It goes without saying that this is an ambitious project; and Professor Ulich has demonstrated his ability to meet its challenge.

The opening chapter clarifies the meaning of the six factors which our author sees as the *sine qua non* of life within a tolerable society, namely: opportunities for physical survival, opportunities to work, standards of excellence, opportunity for reason, opportunity for faith, and experience of love. This section is followed by two chapters dealing respectively with healthy personal growth and the voice of history to our present day. Out of this background grows the body of the volume, which is concerned with the problem of relating organically to human life the major cultural activities of man: education, art, politics, and philosophy. It would be impossible to do justice to any one of these chapters in a review of this length. This review must be limited, therefore, to the making of observations which will indicate the quality and scope of these discussions.

The impartial reader can scarcely avoid being impressed by the breadth of Professor Ulich's scholarship, and by his ability to see problems in their comprehensive context. This reviewer confesses to being impressed to the point of wonder at the range of information which the author brings to his investigations. Seldom has there appeared a more fair-minded appraisal of the units which comprise the vanishing "one world." The writer has, of course, the advantage of having participated vitally in the life of both Europe and America; for before coming to the post of Professor of Education in the Harvard Graduate School of Education, he was Minister of Education in Saxony prior to the National Socialist régime).

He is thus able to interpret the American scene to us in a manner

which creates a new awareness of both weaknesses and values. He makes us aware, for instance of both the plus and the minus of the mass-producing High School, as it seeks to perform in our country the task of the Classical *Gymnasium* in Europe. In the chapter on Politics, Professor Ulich points out conditions and trends within our own national life which, we dare say, are seldom recognized by ourselves. He sees, as we who are native Americans (Dr. Ulich is a naturalized U. S. citizen) often fail to see, the polarity which exists in our society between the trend toward nationality and the trend of the masses toward political self-assertion. More important still, he offers a solution which moves away from government patriarchy, toward a society in which social and cultural education of adults is undertaken seriously as a means to a sound social policy.

One feature makes this volume almost unique among books of its kind: it dares to suggest that the most profound solutions to the problem of man and his relations to reality must be found in the area of religious faith. Without attempting to speak as a theologian, Dr. Ulich speaks with conviction at the point of the validity of religious faith as a guide to the attainment of the basic unities of spirit which must underly the unities upon which a sound civilization must rest. It is refreshing to find a scholar of this ability and renown who is so obviously tender to the attitude of other-worldliness.

This review has become lengthy; let the reader interpret this as a compliment to the author. *Conditions of Civilized Living* is outstanding for its ability to convey to the reader an awareness of the complexity of modern life, and of the possibilities for richness of life which spring from this very complexity. As a textbook in social ethics, it is a wholesome corrective to the current epidemic of volumes which are so

unthinkingly leftist in outlook. The book deserves a wide circulation and intensive study.

HAROLD B. KUHN,
Professor of Philosophy of Religion,
Asbury Theological Seminary.

The Church and Christian Education,
by Paul H. Vieth. St. Louis: Beth-
any Press, 1947. 341 pp. \$2.50.

The author of this book is Horace Bushnell Professor of Christian Education in Yale Divinity School. The work itself is a summary of the findings of a committee of sixty members appointed by the International Council of Religious Education to define the present status of Christian education and indicate its future course.

The book deals largely with the history and philosophy of religious education, disclaiming any detailed consideration of method. The basic philosophy expressed is that of Bushnell, Coe and Dewey as projected in what is known as "the growth theory" of religious education. Especial notice is given to the increasing trend toward secularization.

The weaknesses of the church school are said to be: lack of professional guidance; the prevalent idea that the Sunday School is primarily for children; failure to see that evangelism and education are aspects of the same thing, namely education; limitation of the curriculum to Bible study; the idea that the needs of the student can be met by content-teaching. With apparent reluctance, the author hints at the eventual disappearance of the Sunday School.

The continuous, contemporary revelation of God in men and history is held by Vieth to be equally authoritative with the Biblical revelation. The basic theological presupposition with respect to the nature of man is that man is by natural processes a child of God, and "can be sinful only because

he is a child of God." "We should never give up the conception that we are dealing with the children of God who are growing up within the body of Christ." Thus men as members of the human family are children of God and form a spiritual unity.

One can sense the pressure of the neo-orthodox movement and the European "return to the Bible", although the book represents the time-honored "inclusive policy" with its left wing humanists and pragmatic naturalists, pantheistic center and right wing orthodoxy to be satisfied. The author assents, in general, to Wellhausen's theory of Biblical interpretation.

Vieth maintains that the study of mental hygiene furnishes new insights as to sin and salvation, and that the physical sciences have given new insights about the nature of God. A crisis Christian experience is defined as "the problematic situation, the disturbed equilibrium which compels a fresh adjustment." The author's use of the word 'adjustment' is in keeping with contemporary pragmatism in education. With respect to the teaching function the book is committed to instrumentalism.

Some confusion is expressed with respect to the curriculum. Says Vieth: "The place which should be accorded the Bible, the creeds and other elements of the Christian tradition constitute a problem." However, he adds: "There are those who would approach the problem of authority in Christian education by prescribing what must be accepted and believed by their pupils. This point of view is not congenial to Protestant thinking." "Does not the inspiring story of Adoniram Judson and others of the great missionary and social leaders contain more value for Christian education than the account of the campaigns of Joshua?"

Chapter V entitled "The Family in Christian Education" suggests the necessity for the rediscovery of the home. It is always inspiring to find an author

giving constructive attention to the home, and it is the hope of this reviewer that the next step will be to focus greater emphasis upon the individual as a religious problem.

There will be need for lay workers in religious education, as in the Red Cross, for some time to come, whatever may be the weaknesses of this policy. These persons must be trained through adequate agencies, which are largely lacking today.

Our author believes that the church should begin to get the ecumenical vision in the home community. He recommends an increasing degree of interdenominational supervision over denominational activities.

There are many fine things said in this book, although this reviewer regrets that its presuppositions are those of contemporary liberalism in religion. This serves a two-fold result: it makes the volume to be wholesome as a plumb-line for conservative practice; and at the same time, it limits its field of specific usefulness to the church program which is oriented in liberal thought.

HAROLD C. MASON,
Professor of Christian Education,
Northern Baptist Theological Seminary.

The Practical Use of the Greek New Testament, by Kenneth S. Wuest.
Chicago: Moody Press, 1946. 156 pp. \$2.00.

Greek students will be attracted by the title of this book, one of several by this professor in Moody Bible Institute. Prof. Wuest has given some very helpful material, although in an informal style of writing which sometimes seems inappropriate for a published book. The chapter titles are promising: they refer to the practical use of tense and mood, of prepositions, etc.; to the method of presenting this material to the congregation; and to the place of the Holy Spirit in this

interpretation. The contents of these chapters are of value at least in suggesting methods of study and possible sources of real value in the Greek text.

Nevertheless, this reviewer seriously disagrees with the book at two vital points. The first of these disagreements is with the author's dogmatism concerning the rules of Greek syntax and grammar. For instance, he states, in italics, "There is no appeal from decisions that are based on such universally acknowledged rules of syntax as these" (p. 147-8). One is tempted to adopt one of Wuest's favorite thoughts and say, "That simply is not so." The Greek text does clarify grammar and syntax infinitely more than does the English. However, the Greek of the New Testament is not the strict literary form of the earlier classical literature. It is rather the Greek of a later period—the spoken, living dialect—with the tendency of any spoken language to exercise occasional liberties with the rules of grammar and syntax. Furthermore, the New Testament writers doubtless did not possess copies of the grammar books by whose rules we attempt to interpret their writings; so that in some passages we may *not* be able to say, with Wuest, "This . . . ends all further discussion", and that the rule "is just as sure as the mathematical rule that two and two make four" (p. 26).

In this connection, an objection must be voiced to the author's interpretation of certain phrases. For example, it is hardly evident that the preposition ἐπὶ, when used with the genitive case, always means "contact" (p. 71). See, e.g., Lk. 4:27, Acts 11:28, etc. When Wuest further applies this interpretation to John 6:19 and insists that Jesus must have walked precisely upon the surface of the water, walking "up and down a wave, and into the trough between that wave and the next", the strain upon the meaning seems to be beyond reason—

and revelation. Again, Wuest limits the use of the present imperative with $\mu\eta$ to a command for the cessation of an action already in progress (p. 42)—i.e., "stop doing" an action; whereas this construction is also used for a command *not to begin* doing something, as is probable in Matt. 19:6, I Cor. 7:12, etc.

The second objectionable feature is less excusable than the first if, as it seems, the book was intended for New Testament students generally; for Wuest's primary interest seems to be to demonstrate that the Greek text proves Calvinistic soteriology so conclusively that to hold any other view is almost *prima facie* evidence of faulty scholarship, or worse. He does not even perform the courtesy of making it clear that reputable scholars may disagree with him at some points. He seems occasionally to go out of his way to use examples from which his conclusions will give offense to non-Calvanists (e.g., pp. 30-1, 44). Of more serious consequence, he sometimes begins on the fairly sure ground of grammar but draws conclusions which are largely subjective and are at least not

the only ones possible from the grammar (pp. 30-1, 36, esp. 47, 48). He seems willing, at times, to modify even his strict rules of grammar where to hold them consistently might compromise his theology (pp. 52-5). Finally, there are altogether too many instances where grammatical scholarship of very questionable character is used to yield excellent Calvinistic conclusions; a notorious example being his use of a statement by an unconverted man, the Philippian jailor (Acts 16:30), as authority for the doctrine of eternal security (pp. 53-4. See also pp. 50, 68).

This book can be recommended for those who can read it with discernment. It contains material of merit to the pastor who is seeking to make serious use of his Greek New Testament. At the same time, the thoughtful user can hardly fail to recognize the limitations which the author's bias places upon the objectivity of his work.

J. HAROLD GREENLEE
Professor of Greek,
Asbury Theological Seminary.

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